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CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE AND 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 19641 represented a seminal legislative 
accomplishment of the twentieth century.  Its eleven titles addressed racial 
discrimination in voting (Title I), public accommodations (Title II), public 
facilities (Title III), public education (Title IV), publicly financed programs 
(Title VI) and employment (Title VII).2  It sought to remedy legislatively the 
Jim Crow laws and practices that had long contributed to making blacks 
second-class citizens in America and it provided the Executive Branch tools, 
especially in Title III and VI, to help implement Brown v. Board of Education.3 
In view of the bill’s focus on racial discrimination, one would expect the 
legislative discussion to have centered around the injustice of segregation and 
the burden it imposed on American society.  Much of it did.  Yet legislators 
devoted a substantial portion of their attention to constitutional issues relevant 
to the bill. 
Academic discussions of constitutional interpretation tend to focus on the 
work of the federal judiciary generally and the Supreme Court specifically.  
Constitutional law, especially at America’s law schools but more universally, 
too, focuses on the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.  In recent years, 
however, a number of scholars have noted that a significant body of 
constitutional interpretation does, and should, occur outside of the courts, in 
the executive and legislative branches of our federal government.4  Abundant 
 
* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I am grateful to Anthony Gilbert, 
Jackie Loerop, and Tim McFarlin for their able research assistance, to Margaret McDermott, J.D. 
for her help with various references, and to Mary Dougherty for patiently retyping the 
manuscript.  All shortcomings are my responsibility, not theirs. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1237 
(2001). 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. See, e.g., NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); 
LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL 
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examples exist of constitutional discussion outside the judiciary. Yet it is hard 
to imagine an instance where constitutional interpretation so dominated 
discussion of proposed legislation as was the case with the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  The executive and legislative branches engaged in an extensive dialogue 
that focused heavily on the constitutional issues, real and imagined, which the 
proposed legislation raised.5  The discussion was wide-ranging, touching on a 
number of areas of constitutional law.  To be sure, some legislators and 
witnesses advanced dubious constitutional notions to serve political ends, yet 
much of the discussion was serious, informed, and thoughtful.  It reflected 
different understandings of constitutional language and history, competing 
visions of key concepts of constitutional law, and an earnest effort to grapple 
with judicial precedents and past legislative activity.  Congressional leaders 
held hearings, in part, to “produce a final record clarifying the constitutional 
powers of Congress to act in this field.”6  Whereas proponents found clear and 
pervasive constitutional authority, opponents labeled constitutional objections 
“insurmountable”7 and prophesied that passage would spell the end of 
constitutional government in America.8 
Although Congress debated the constitutionality of several provisions of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, much of the debate focused on whether Title II, 
addressing discrimination in places of public accommodations, was 
constitutional.  It was appropriate that it did.  Title II addressed a pressing 
national problem.  In the early 1960s, the second-class status of blacks in 
America was nowhere more evident than in the segregated patterns of service 
which persisted in Southern states.  At restaurants, motels, and other 
businesses ostensibly open to the public, blacks were routinely denied service 
or served at separate facilities or areas. 
Of the three branches of the national government, the Court had, of course, 
been the most progressive during the 1950s and early 1960s in addressing Jim 
 
PROCESS (1988); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
 5. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate 
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 1151 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights—Public 
Accommodations] (statement of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey) (“A great deal of time has been 
expended . . . on the Commerce Clause. . . .”). 
 6. Id. at 1 (statements of Sen. Warren G. Magnuson); id. at 180 (statement of Sen. Philip A. 
Hart) (“It is important that we have the most careful analysis of the appropriate constitutional 
powers which are available on which to base our legislative proposals.”). 
 7. Id. at 884 (testimony of Gov. Donald Russell). 
 8. Civil Rights—The President’s Program, 1963: Hearings on S. 1731 and S. 1750 Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 36 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights—President’s 
Program] (statements of Sen. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr.) (“[W]e might as well throw the Constitution 
out the window. . . .”); see also Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the House Comm. on 
Rules, 88th Cong. 388 (1964) [hereinafter Rules Committee] (statement of Rep. William M. 
Tuck) (arguing that the Act “destroys our Constitution and shatters our Bill of Rights”). 
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Crow laws and practices.  Under Chief Justice Earl Warren’s leadership, the 
Court had struck down discriminatory practices, generally in unanimous 
decisions.  Although the Court had declared “separate but equal” treatment a 
denial of equal protection in public schools9 and other state-operated facilities 
during the 1950s, it had not held that the Constitution precluded private 
entrepreneurs from discriminating based on race.  By the early 1960s, the 
Court had gone about as far as it could go on that issue without splintering.  A 
series of “sit-in” cases raised the constitutionality of private discrimination in 
places of public accommodation.  The Court reached a constitutional impasse 
by the spring of 1963.10 
At that same time, independently and coincidentally, the political branches 
commenced a “constitutional dialogue”11 that ultimately resulted in a political 
resolution to the issue that stymied the Court.  Much of the discussion centered 
on the scope of the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
potential sources of congressional power for the legislation, and the concepts 
of federalism and government regulation of private property.  The 
constitutional debate involved two separate discussions.  One addressed 
whether Title II was constitutional.  Proponents argued that the Commerce 
Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress ample 
authority to pass Title II.  Critics claimed the legislation would expand the 
power of the federal government at the expense of the states.12  The Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution reserved the police power to the states.13  If 
“the theory” behind Title II was valid, the Federal Government could “regulate 
and coerce every activity, whether State or individual, within the bounds of 
any and every State.”14  The legislation would deprive of property those 
operating places of public accommodations without due process of law.15 
The discussion did not, however, simply turn on whether the legislation 
was constitutional.  A second debate, among proponents of the bill, turned on 
whether the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment furnished the 
proper basis for Title II. 
This Article presents a case study of the constitutional discussion regarding 
Title II.  The legislative discussion of Title II provided a rich consideration of 
 
 9. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–
99 (1954). 
 10. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, The Supreme Court and Civil Rights Since 1940: 
Opportunities and Limitations, 4 BARRY L. REV. 39, 51 n.78 (2003) (discussing the Court’s 
“ongoing internal dispute resulting from the sit-in movement”). 
 11. I take the term from FISHER, supra note 4. 
 12. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 83–84 (statements of Sen. 
Strom Thurmond). 
 13. Id. at 85. 
 14. Id. at 88. 
 15. Id. at 84. 
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constitutional issues.  Although officials of the executive branch did much of 
the heavy lifting, many legislators were heavily engaged, especially in 
expressing constitutional objections to the legislation and in formulating the 
case for using the Fourteenth Amendment.  As such, the exchange represented 
an often ignored phenomenon—constitutional dialogue in the political 
branches.  Legislators took seriously their duty to interpret the Constitution.  
They did so, though, with the understanding that the Supreme Court was the 
ultimate constitutional interpreter.  They sought to craft legislation that would 
coincide with the Court’s constitutional conclusions.  The executive–legislative 
discussion of constitutional issues raised theories of constitutional 
interpretation that generally did not find a judicial voice. Moreover, the 
constitutional dialogue included the Supreme Court.  The legislative 
discussion, and the decisions which flowed from it, profoundly influenced the 
constitutional issues the Court faced.  Indeed, the political branches played a 
significant role in addressing and resolving the constitutional issues involved, 
and ultimately the Court was disposed to defer to it. 
II.  PROPOSING LEGISLATION: THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
The Kennedy Administration had moved slowly regarding Civil Rights 
legislation in early 1963, offering very modest legislation in February of that 
year, which focused on voting rights.  The Administration had concluded that 
there was little interest in civil rights, in Congress or the country.16  As Burke 
Marshall, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, put it, “the 
problem of the Negro was still invisible to the country at large until the spring 
of 1963.”17  As such, prospects for legislative success seemed unlikely.18  
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield thought a Democratic President could 
not produce civil rights legislation.19  Mansfield’s predecessor, Vice President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, was also pessimistic.20 
 
 16. Third Oral History, Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, at 65 (June 13, 
1964) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program). 
 17. Id. at 61 (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program) 
(proposing legislation would be “gesture”); Seventh recorded interview by Anthony Lewis with 
Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall, at 549 (Dec. 22, 1964) (transcript available in the John F. 
Kennedy Library, Oral History Program) (stating no public demand for legislation before 
Birmingham). 
 18. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 110 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert 
F. Kennedy); see also Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, supra note 16, at 65. 
 19. Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, supra note 16, at 106; Seventh 
recorded interview by Anthony Lewis with Robert F. Kennedy and Burke Marshall, supra note 
17, at 549–50; Fifth recorded Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshal, at 106–07 (June 
20, 1964) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program). 
 20. Interview by Anthony Lewis with Burke Marshall, supra note 16, at 112. 
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Civil rights protests had placed on the Supreme Court’s docket in the early 
1960s the issue of racial discrimination in public places.  Black students in a 
number of Southern states staged peaceful sit-ins at lunch counters or other 
segregated facilities.  The students, having been routinely arrested and 
convicted, challenged these events as denials of their right to Equal Protection 
of the laws.  Although petitioners asked the Court to find state action in the 
police conduct and judicial enforcement,21 the Court proceeded more 
cautiously, ruling for plaintiffs but on narrower grounds that avoided the 
constitutional issue.  For instance, in Garner v. Louisiana,22 the Court struck 
down convictions of protestors for disturbing the peace but did so on the 
narrow grounds that the convictions were so lacking in evidentiary support that 
they violated Due Process.23  Only Justice Douglas was prepared to reach the 
ultimate constitutional issue and find an Equal Protection violation.  He argued 
that restaurants, though “private enterprises,” were “public facilities in which 
the States may not enforce a policy of racial segregation.”24  Louisiana could 
not enforce through executive or judicial action25 its “custom”26 of segregation 
in private businesses affected with a public interest. 
During the 1962 term, the Court considered six other “sit-in” cases.27  In 
four of the cases,28 state courts had convicted students, most of whom were 
African-Americans, of trespass for staging sit-ins at segregated lunch counters.  
In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, two African-American ministers were 
convicted of aiding and abetting a violation of Birmingham, Alabama’s 
criminal trespass code by encouraging two college students to stage the sit-in 
at issue in Gober.29  In Wright v. Georgia, six Negro youths were convicted for 
breach of the peace “for peacefully playing basketball in a public park in 
Savannah, Georgia, on the early afternoon of Monday, January 23, 1961.”30  In 
near unanimous decisions announced on May 20, 1963, the Court reversed the 
convictions in all of the cases. 
 
 21. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF 
LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 307 (1994). 
 22. 368 U.S. 157 (1961). 
 23. Id. at 163. 
 24. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 25. Id. at 178, 179. 
 26. Id. at 181. 
 27. Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 
374 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 
(1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Petersen v. City of 
Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
 28. Avent, 373 U.S. 375; Gober, 373 U.S. 374; Lombard, 373 U.S. at 268–69; Petersen, 373 
U.S. at 245. 
 29. Shuttlesworth, 373 U.S. at 263. 
 30. Wright, 373 U.S. at 285. 
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In the five “sit-in” cases, petitioners claimed in part that their rights to 
Equal Protection of the laws were violated by their arrests.  In three of the 
cases, local ordinances mandated racial segregation in restaurants.31  In these 
cases, the Court held that the presence of the ordinance foreclosed any defense 
that the entrepreneur was exercising private choice. 
When a state agency passes a law compelling persons to discriminate against 
other persons because of race, and the State’s criminal processes are employed 
in a way which enforces the discrimination mandated by that law, such a 
palpable violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be saved by 
attempting to separate the mental urges of the discriminators.32 
No New Orleans ordinance prohibited the McCrory Five and Ten Cent 
Store from serving blacks.33  Accordingly, the Court could not resolve the state 
action riddle so easily in Lombard v. Louisiana, a case in which students were 
arrested for sitting in at a whites-only lunch counter.34  Yet a few days before 
the students were arrested, the Superintendent of Police and the Mayor of New 
Orleans had declared in widely publicized statements that the police would act 
to stop sit-in demonstrations.35 The Court construed the statements as 
endorsing segregated service and, accordingly, deemed them to be the 
equivalent of local ordinances to that effect.36  Similarly, in Wright v. Georgia, 
the Court found state action in the police conduct in arresting the Negro 
basketball players in a public park.  The officers acted as they did “to enforce 
racial discrimination in the park.”37 
The presence of ordinances or constructive ordinances in the cases decided 
during the 1962 term allowed the Court to dodge the basic constitutional 
question: Did the Equal Protection Clause preclude a private entrepreneur from 
refusing services to blacks based on their race?  In each case, the Court could 
plausibly attribute the refusal to serve blacks to public policy, not private 
choice.  The near unanimous decisions on the narrow issues concealed a 
significant division in the Court on the basic constitutional issue that the “sit-
in” cases raised. 
Some, like Justice Black, believed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
preclude a private entrepreneur from refusing to serve blacks in his restaurant.  
During the Court’s conference on November 9, 1962, he said: 
 
 31. See, e.g., Avent, 373 U.S. at 257 n.8 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gober, 373 U.S. at 255 n.4 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Petersen, 373 U.S. at 246–47. 
 32. Petersen, 373 U.S. at 248. 
 33. Lombard, 373 U.S. at 268. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 269–70. 
 36. Id. at 273. 
 37. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 292 (1963). 
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We have a system of private ownership of property—we should not turn down 
these rights by constitutional construction.  I believe that a store owner, the 
same as a home owner, has a right to say who can come on his premises and 
how long they can stay.  A store owner, like a house owner, can tell a customer 
to leave.  If he has that right, he cannot be helpless to call the police and get 
help to throw the customer out.  One man on another man’s property can be 
thrown off with force, if necessary.  That rule is necessary if private property is 
to be protected.  I would rank stores along with homes, although there is, of 
course, a difference in history and sentiment.38 
Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart agreed with Black’s views.39  On the 
contrary, Justice Douglas thought such segregation unconstitutional, a view 
with which Justice Goldberg sympathized.40  Goldberg did not, however, join 
Douglas’s concurrence in Lombard.  Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan 
urged the ultimate strategy adopted in order to decide the cases in a near-
unanimous fashion without reaching the basic, and divisive, constitutional 
issue. 
As the Court reached an impasse on the constitutional issue, events at 
Birmingham changed the political landscape.  The events there and elsewhere 
in the spring of 1963 transformed public opinion.  National television 
audiences witnessed Bull Connor’s police commit barbaric assaults on 
“defenseless schoolchildren,” attacking them with clubs, fire hoses, and dogs 
during a Good Friday march.41  The brutal display was a national 
embarrassment.  The events moved the Kennedy Administration to expand the 
legislative proposals it had offered earlier that year.42  On June 11, 1963, 
President Kennedy gave an eloquent nationally broadcast address in which he 
outlined the civil rights legislation he would propose.  The “moral issue” 
involved was “as old as the scriptures and . . . as clear as the American 
Constitution,”43 said Kennedy.  The President followed his address with more 
sweeping legislative proposals which formed the basis of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
 
 38. THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS 
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 712 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
 39. Id. at 714–16. 
 40. Id. at 714, 716. 
 41. Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong. 907 (1963) [hereinafter Civil Rights] (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler). 
 42. John F. Kennedy, The President’s News Conference (May 22, 1963), in THE PUBLIC 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY, JAN. 1–NOV. 22, 1963, 
at 423 (1964); John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil 
Rights (June 11, 1963), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
JOHN F. KENNEDY, JAN. 1–NOV. 22, 1963, at 469 [hereinafter Radio and Television Report] 
(“The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or 
State or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them.”). 
 43. Radio and Television Report, supra note 42, at 469. 
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Kennedy met on several occasions in June 1963 with legislative leaders to 
discuss the proposed legislation.  The Administration’s proposal won broad 
support from leadership except Republican Leader Everett Dirksen who 
initially balked at supporting Title II dealing with discrimination in places of 
public accommodations.44  Ultimately, Senator Mike Mansfield introduced the 
Administration’s bill, S. 1731, and he and Dirksen introduced S. 1750, the 
same bill without the public accommodations provision Dirksen was not 
prepared to support.45  That section was introduced as S. 1732.46  S. 1731 and 
S. 1750 were referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee; S. 1732 was referred 
to the Senate Commerce Committee.47  In the House, Representative Emanuel 
Celler introduced the Administration’s bill, H.R. 7152, which was referred to 
the Judiciary Committee that he chaired.48 
Much of the discussions addressed the constitutional basis of the public 
accommodations section of the proposed bill, Title II.  To a great extent, it 
paralleled the 1875 Civil Rights Act.49  The 1875 Act had rested on section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and had imposed criminal sanctions for anyone 
who prevented someone from using railroads, hotels, or theaters based on their 
race.50  In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court held the Act unconstitutional 
because the Fourteenth Amendment reached only State, not private, action.51 
Like its nineteenth-century predecessor, Title II prohibited owners of hotels, 
restaurants, and other places of public accommodations from discriminating 
based on race.  Southerners insisted that precedent rendered Title II 
unconstitutional.52  The Court had not, however, ruled that Congress lacked 
power under the Commerce Clause to pass a public accommodations bill like 
Title II.  The Civil Rights Cases had specifically not considered whether the 
Commerce Clause authorized the 1875 Act.53 
Not all thought the Constitution as clear as President Kennedy suggested.  
While opponents of civil rights legislation denied that the Federal Government 
had any power to act, those sympathetic to the cause divided between two 
theories of constitutional power.  On the one hand, section 1 the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbade States from denying any person the equal protection of 
 
 44. See RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART 
OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 15–16 (2001). 
 45. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 23–25 (statements of Sen. Everett 
Dirksen). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18–19 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2413. 
 49. 18 Stat. 235 (1875). 
 50. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9–10 (1883). 
 51. Id. at 11. 
 52. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 473 (statement of Gov. 
George Wallace); id. at 500–01 (statements of Gov. George Wallace and Sen. Strom Thurmond). 
 53. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18, 19. 
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the law.54  Section 5 empowered Congress to enforce the terms of the 
Amendment.55  The Equal Protection Clause, which was designed largely to 
redress racial subordination of blacks, seemed to speak most directly to the 
“moral issue.” Some thought the Administration could best demonstrate its 
sincerity on the moral issue by relying on the Fourteenth Amendment.56  Yet 
much discrimination arguably involved private action, and the Supreme Court 
in The Civil Rights Cases had held that Congress could only address “state 
action,” not private discriminatory conduct, under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Alternatively, the Commerce Clause, which allowed Congress to regulate 
commerce among the states, had proved an efficacious instrument to address a 
host of problems, including some intrastate activities which affected the 
national economy.  Yet the Commerce Clause’s main focus was not race, and 
some worried that its use would signal broader federal regulation. 
The choice between the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment 
had partisan ramifications, too.  History linked the Republican Party to the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Democratic Party to the Commerce Clause.57  
Republican votes would be needed to pass legislation, especially in the Senate 
where a two-thirds vote was required to stop a filibuster; but in 1963, 
Republicans still associated the Commerce Clause with Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and were loath to use that provision as the constitutional basis for the bill.58  
Republicans might be more willing to support Kennedy’s legislation if it rested 
on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The discussion regarding the proper basis for the Civil Rights bill extended 
to the highest levels of the executive branch.  President Kennedy “raised a 
question” regarding the constitutional basis of the proposed legislation that 
resulted in “quite a number of conversations.”59  Indeed, Robert F. Kennedy 
recalled more time being spent on the constitutional issue than on any other 
facet of the proposal.60  The Kennedys had doubts regarding the issue and 
initially favored using the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Commerce Clause had 
important Justice Department advocates, too, namely Burke Marshall and 
 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 55. Id. § 5. 
 56. See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Rights Bill Strategy: Sidestepping of the 14th Amendment in 
Kennedy Proposal Examined Bright Light ‘Narrow’ Grounds, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1963, at 115. 
 57. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1870 (statement of Joseph D. Rauh); id. at 1947 
(statement of Walter Reuther). 
 58. Interview by Larry J. Hackman with Burke Marshall, as Assistant Attorney General for 
the Civil Rights Division, at 4–5 (Jan. 19–20, 1970) (transcript available in the John F. Kennedy 
Library, Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program). 
 59. Interview by Anthony Lewis with Robert F. Kennedy, at 498 (Dec. 1964) (transcript 
available in the John F. Kennedy Library, Oral History Program). 
 60. Id. 
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Archibald Cox.61  Ultimately Marshall’s arguments apparently convinced the 
Kennedys.62 
Strategic considerations also shaped the Administration’s approach. A bill 
resting on the Commerce Clause would come under the jurisdiction of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, which progressive Senator Warren 
Magnuson chaired.  A bill predicated on the Fourteenth Amendment would 
have fallen under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee chaired by arch 
segregationist Senator James Eastland of Mississippi.63 
III.  CONGRESS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. The Commerce Clause 
Congressional proponents of Title II divided over the constitutional basis 
for the legislation.  Some emphasized the Commerce Clause,64 others the 
Fourteenth Amendment.65  A third group declined to choose between the two 
approaches66 or thought it prudent to rely on both.67  The Kennedy 
Administration relied on both provisions, but placed principal emphasis on the 
Commerce Clause.68  During the course of the summer of 1963, the 
Administration’s emphasis on the Commerce Clause increased.  The 
Administration’s reliance on the Commerce Clause as the constitutional basis 
for Title II turned largely on its conclusion that it clearly gave Congress 
authority to legislate.69  Robert Kennedy thought “[t]here is no question but 
 
 61. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 28 (testimony of Atty. Gen. 
Robert F. Kennedy). 
 62. ROBERT KENNEDY: IN HIS OWN WORDS 174 (Edwin O. Guthman & Jeffery Shulman 
eds., 1988). 
 63. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 838 (comments of Sen. John 
Pastore). 
 64. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 96 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert 
F. Kennedy) (stating that the Administration bill “relies primarily on the commerce clause”). 
 65. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 795–96 (statement of 
Sen. John Sherman Cooper); Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 2586 (testimony of Rep. Richard S. 
Schweiker). 
 66. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 776 (testimony of Dean 
Erwin Griswold) (calling both approaches “strong and embracing” and advocating use of both); 
Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1874 (testimony of Joseph Rauh). 
 67. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1152 (statement of Sen. 
Hubert H. Humphrey); id. at 273–74 (letter from Prof. Louis H. Pollak). 
 68. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1376 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) 
(“rely[ing] primarily upon the commerce clause”); id. at 1387–88 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert 
F. Kennedy). 
 69. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 26 (statement of Atty. Gen. 
Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 28 (statement of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); Civil Rights, supra 
note 41, at 1376 (statement of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (stating that there can be “no real 
question” about Congress’s authority under Commerce Clause). 
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that the Supreme Court would uphold the constitutionality” of Title II.70  To be 
sure, the bill addressed a “moral issue,” but Congress had attacked other moral 
issues—child labor, prostitution, gambling—under the Commerce Clause.71 
The Kennedy Administration made the opening pitch as Congress debated 
the scope of the Commerce Clause.  Robert Kennedy testified before a 
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee and before the Senate 
Committees on Commerce and on the Judiciary.  Much of his testimony 
addressed constitutional issues as did that of his associate, Burke Marshall.  
Kennedy first appeared before the House subcommittee on June 26, 1963, and 
his approach there was illustrative.  Although much of his presentation 
outlined the proposed legislation and its moral justifications, Kennedy devoted 
fourteen paragraphs to the constitutional issues.72  Kennedy pointed out that 
two constitutional provisions related to Title II: the Commerce Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment.73  The former granted Congress “extensive power” to 
address “practices which burden the free flow of interstate commerce or 
otherwise affect national trade.”74  “There can be no real question about the 
authority of the Congress to deal with discriminatory practices by enterprises 
whose business affects interstate commerce or interstate travel.”75 
Discrimination at places of public accommodation clearly affected 
interstate commerce and travel.  The restrictions imposed on Negro travelers 
burdened interstate travel.  “Our whole economy suffers,” said Kennedy, and 
“the Nation’s business is impaired.”76  Business did not move into areas that 
practiced discrimination.  Travel and commerce were reduced.  Even local 
discrimination imposed a “squeeze” on commerce.77 
Kennedy offered the Equal Protection Clause as an alternative basis.78  
Much had changed since the Court decided The Civil Rights Cases, said 
Kennedy.79  Changes in social facts might cause the Court to view Congress’s 
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment differently.80  Kennedy 
thought, on June 26, 1963, at least, that the contemporary Court would reverse 
The Civil Rights Cases and uphold Title II.81  Still, the Commerce Clause was 
a safer, less controversial basis. 
 
 70. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 156; see also id. at 166–67. 
 71. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 96 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert 
F. Kennedy). 
 72. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1375–77. 
 73. Id. at 1375–76. 
 74. Id.; see also id. at 1389. 
 75. Id. at 1376. 
 76. Id. at 1374. 
 77. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1374 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy). 
 78. Id. at 1387–88. 
 79. Id. at 1376. 
 80. Id. at 1376, 1387. 
 81. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1395, 1410, 1415, 1417. 
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Five days later, Kennedy began similar testimony to the Senate Commerce 
Committee, which he gave over a three-day period.82  Again, in his opening 
statement, he emphasized the Commerce Clause as the safest basis for Title II 
while opining that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided a suitable, 
but more constitutionally controversial, alternative.83  He added an important 
wrinkle to his presentation.  To rebut the contention that Title II infringed on 
rights of private property, he presented thirty-six federal statutes in which 
Congress had regulated private business under the Commerce Clause.84  He 
also offered a list of statutes and ordinances in nine Southern states that 
required private businesses to segregate.85  Private business could hardly claim 
regulatory immunity if Congress and state legislatures had been subjecting it to 
such measures for so long.  Much of Kennedy’s testimony related to 
constitutional issues raised by questions from Committee members.  For 
instance, Senators John Pastore, Norris Cotton, Thruston Morton, and Frank 
Lausche quizzed the Attorney General regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.86  
Senator Mike Monroney focused on the scope of the Commerce Clause.87  
Senator Strom Thurmond questioned Kennedy on a range of constitutional 
issues relating to Title II, which covered more than thirty-five pages of the 
hearings on July 1.88 
Burke Marshall followed Kennedy to the witness stand before the Senate 
Commerce Committee after the July 4 break.  While the first half of his 
opening statement addressed the moral basis of Title II, the second half 
addressed constitutional issues.89  He discussed “additional aspects” of the 
Commerce Clause rationale that supported the Administration’s “belief that 
legislation enacted pursuant to that clause would be clearly constitutional.”90  
His statement was apparently designed to fill gaps in Kennedy’s testimony and 
to address subjects committee questions had raised.  For instance, he began by 
stating reasons why “discrimination itself . . . adversely affects interstate 
commerce.”91  He explained: 
Section 2 of the bill describes in detail the effect of racial discrimination on 
national commerce.  Discrimination burdens Negro interstate travelers and 
thereby inhibits interstate travel.  It artificially restricts the market available for 
interstate goods and services.  It leads to the withholding of patronage by 
 
 82. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 17. 
 83. Id. at 23, 27–28. 
 84. Id. at 19. 
 85. Id. at 20–21. 
 86. Id. at 25–28, 57–58, 73–75, 76–78. 
 87. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 66–71. 
 88. Id. at 83–120. 
 89. Id. at 205–07. 
 90. Id. at 206. 
 91. Id. 
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potential customers for such goods and services.  It inhibits the holding of 
conventions and meetings in segregated cities. It interferes with businesses that 
wish to obtain the services of persons who do not choose to subject themselves 
to segregation and discrimination.  And it restricts business enterprises in their 
choice of location for offices and plants, thus preventing the most effective 
allocation of national resources.92 
He also cited substantial precedent to support the proposition that Congress 
could regulate intrastate activity that affected interstate commerce.93 
Finally, Kennedy testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee for nine 
days beginning July 18, 1963.94  Much of the testimony related to Title II and 
constitutional issues pertaining to it.  Kennedy again noted the 
Administration’s primary reliance on the Commerce Clause.95  The Fourteenth 
Amendment raised “very far-reaching and grave issues” that Kennedy 
outlined, especially relating to the licensing theory of state action which was 
the basis of legislation Senator John Sherman Cooper and Senator Thomas 
Dodd had introduced.96  Still, the Administration was prepared to draw upon 
the Fourteenth Amendment to attack conventional forms of state action.97  
Senator Sam Ervin interrogated Kennedy at length for the nine days, often on 
constitutional issues. 
Kennedy and Marshall were by no means the sole spokespersons for the 
Commerce Clause approach.  Other Democrats also noted the capacious nature 
of the Commerce Clause.  Congress had used this “most sweeping and 
significant direct source of power available to the National Government” in 
“many and varied ways to meet the changing nature of our Nation’s life and 
economy.”98  Senator Philip Hart explained that the clause helped promote the 
movement of goods in interstate commerce, remove obstacles to commerce, 
stimulate commerce, and even to prohibit intrastate activities “which interfere 
or obstruct in a substantial way the freedom of commerce between the 
States.”99  Senator Warren Magnuson also articulated an expansive view of the 
black letter law relating to the clause that was articulated more than two 
decades earlier: 
The Court has held over and over again that the power of Congress over 
interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce between 
 
 92. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 206–07. 
 93. Id. at 207. 
 94. Kennedy also testified on July 24, 25, 30, 31, August 1, 8, 23, and September 11, 1963.  
See Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8. 
 95. Id. at 96. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 181 (statement of Sen. Phillip 
Hart). 
 99. Id. 
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States; it extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make 
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.100 
Congressmen repeatedly challenged witnesses regarding the scope of the 
Commerce Clause.  In response to questions from Senator Thurmond, Marshall 
also offered a broad test.  Commerce, he said, “encompasses all matters that 
affect the national economy, that involve more than one State.”101  Marshall 
elaborated in the following exchange with Senator Winston Prouty: 
Senator Prouty.  By the standards you have set forth in your statement, is there 
any form of commerce which does not have an impact or influence on 
interstate commerce, and which is outside of the scope of congressional power 
of regulation? 
Mr. Marshall.  Senator, I think Congress has the power under the commerce 
clause to deal with any practice, any commercial practice, which is engaged in 
any large numbers of businesses and which in a total sense affects the 
economy and interstate commerce.  And I think that power, in dealing with 
that kind of a problem, gives Congress the power to deal, to regulate very 
small businesses. 
Senator Prouty.  In effect the answer to my question then in “No”? 
Mr. Marshall.  Well, Senator, I think there has to be a substantive problem that 
Congress is dealing with.  I don’t think Congress can use the power of the 
commerce clause to deal with a problem that has nothing to do with commerce 
as such, that is it can’t use the power of the commerce clause to deal with 
something totally unrelated to commercial realities of our national economy.102 
The Administration argued that Congress could use the Commerce Clause 
to regulate any activity that affected interstate commerce; there was no 
requirement of a substantial effect.103  Although Marshall had told Senator 
Prouty that Congress could regulate “any commercial practice,” in the same 
exchange, he adopted the broader formulation which allowed Congress to 
address activities related to “commercial realities of our national economy.”104 
 
 100. Id. at 155. 
 101. Id. at 239. 
 102. Id. at 216–17. 
 103. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 173 (testimony of Atty. Gen. 
Robert F. Kennedy); see also id. at 241 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at 771 
(testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold) (citing United States v. Darby, which extended federal 
power to intrastate activities which “so affect” interstate commerce); Civil Rights—President’s 
Program, supra note 8, at 106 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (stating that court 
decisions make it “quite clear” that the test is “affect interstate commerce”). 
 104. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 216–17; see also id. at 1183, 
1190 (Brief of Prof. Paul A. Freund) (referring not only to Congress’s ability to regulate 
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The Administration conceded that human dignity, not economic concerns, 
motivated the legislation.  That did not, however, counsel against invoking the 
Commerce Clause.  Senator Thurmond asked Kennedy rhetorically whether 
the acts he cited “were primarily designed to regulate economic affairs of life 
and that the basic purpose of this bill is to regulate moral and social affairs?”105  
Kennedy replied: 
Well, Senator, let me say this: I think that the discrimination that is taking 
place at the present time is having a very adverse effect on our economy.  So I 
think that it is quite clear that under the commerce clause even if it was just on 
that aspect and even if you get away from the moral aspect—I think it is quite 
clear that this kind of discrimination has an adverse effect on the economy.  I 
think all you have to do is look at some of the southern communities at the 
present time and the difficult time that they are having.106 
The Administration meticulously laid out the case that discrimination 
impacted interstate commerce.  “Our whole economy suffers” from racial 
discrimination, said Kennedy.107  Others expounded upon the effect of 
discrimination on commerce.108  Under Secretary of Commerce Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Jr. devoted his statement to “the adverse effect of racial 
discrimination in public accommodations on interstate commerce.”109  
Roosevelt reiterated the “effects” that Marshall had identified on July 8, 1963, 
that focused on the way in which “segregation imposes unnatural limitations in 
the conduct of business which are injurious to the free flow of commerce.”110  
He also introduced a new theory regarding the effects of discrimination on 
interstate commerce.  In essence, Roosevelt suggested that racial 
discrimination gave rise to sit-ins, demonstrations, and boycotts, which 
affected interstate commerce.  He argued that “the current instability and 
unrest swirling about various places of public accommodation from time to 
time is directly injurious to interstate commerce.”111  Roosevelt devoted 
 
“practices” substantially affecting commerce but also Congress’s ability to regulate “commercial 
activities”). 
 105. Id. at 95. 
 106. Id.; see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 424 (Justice 
Department Memorandum stating that Congress can reach conditions which “adversely affect” 
allocation of resources). 
 107. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1374. 
 108. See Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 262 (comments of Sen. 
Jacob Javits) (stating that discrimination reduces interstate travel); see also id. at 770–72 
(comments of Dean Erwin Griswold).  But see id. at 851–52 (comments of Sen. Strom 
Thurmond) (denying any burden on commerce). 
 109. Id. at 689. 
 110. Id. at 691. 
 111. Id.; see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 216 (testimony of Atty. 
Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (stating that the demonstrations have had “an extremely adverse effect 
on interstate commerce”); id. at 424–25 (Justice Dep’t Mem.) (“Disputes involving the racially 
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fourteen paragraphs of his statement to providing evidence of this 
phenomenon.112 
The Administration relied heavily on Wickard v. Filburn,113 a case it and 
its allies cited often114 to demonstrate the broad scope of the commerce power.  
When Thurmond suggested that refusal to serve an intrastate traveler was not a 
burden on interstate commerce, Kennedy argued that “innumerable court 
decisions” support the view that local or intrastate activities can affect 
commerce because “we are talking about a cumulative situation,”115 a 
reference he attributed to Wickard’s cumulative effects principle.116  Those 
who opposed Title II criticized Wickard.117  When Dean Griswold indicated he 
supported Wickard although it was “very close to the borderline,” Senator 
Norris Cotton withdrew a comment he had just uttered that he wished 
Griswold was on the Supreme Court.118 
Opponents of the legislation complained that protection of commerce was 
not its principal motive but simply “a convenient peg on which to hang this 
particular hat.”119  The Commerce Clause addressed interstate business 
transactions.  It did not license the federal government to pursue a moral 
vision.  Moreover, they claimed the bill rested on a vision of the Commerce 
Clause that would erase all limits on federal power.  Governor Donald Russell 
of South Carolina testified: 
If this proposed legislation should be sustained, there is no activity of our 
citizens which may not be subjected to direct control by Federal legislation, 
 
discriminatory practices of places of public accommodation give rise to picketing and other 
demonstrations.  The picketing and the demonstrations interfere with the sale of goods and thus 
affect interstate commerce in precisely the same manner as would labor disputes involving such 
establishments.”). 
 112. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 699–700. 
 113. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 114. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 80, 86 (testimony of 
Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 181 (comments of Sen. Philip A. Hart); id. at 775 
(testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold); see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, 
at 216, 223 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 422 (Justice Dep’t Mem.); Civil 
Rights, supra note 41, at 1420 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy); id. at 1885 
(testimony of Joseph Rauh). 
 115. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 105; see Civil Rights—
President’s Program, supra note 8, at 193 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy). 
 116. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 106; see also id. at 190 
(comments of Sen. John Sherman Cooper) (“It can regulate even intrastate commerce where a 
single transaction does not substantially affect interstate commerce, but where the accumulation 
of like transactions throughout the country would substantially affect interstate commerce.”); id. 
at 210 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall). 
 117. See, e.g., Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 220 (statement of Sen. 
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.). 
 118. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 776. 
 119. Id. at 919 (testimony of Fla. Gov. Farris Bryant). 
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and no individual who may not be directly dealt with in relation to any and all 
of his affairs.  Congress would no longer have to find its authority in any other 
part of the Constitution; the commerce clause would authorize anything it 
might choose to do.  Such, we submit, is not our constitutional system.120 
The vision behind the Administration’s bill would leave no role for states,121 
opponents such as Thurmond and others claimed.  Representative Joe D. 
Waggoner, Jr. put the argument most forcefully: “To concede such power to 
the Federal Government is to relegate State and local government to the ashcan 
of history and reduce city halls and State capitols to nothing more than 
concrete monuments to a system of government we once enjoyed.”122  Senator 
Sam Ervin particularly worried over the suggestion that Congress could 
regulate discrimination at restaurants that served food which had moved in 
interstate commerce.  Such a theory would lead to a parade of horribles as 
Congress could regulate marriage (“because the groom gives the bride a ring 
that has moved in interstate commerce”), birth “and all that precedes birth” 
(“because babies stimulate interstate commerce by using safety pins and 
diapers, which have moved in interstate commerce”) and death (“because 
corpses are buried in coffins and caskets which have moved in interstate 
commerce”).123  Similarly, Ervin thought allowing the commerce power to 
reach activities of travelers would expand federal power.  “Congress could get 
some people traveling in interstate commerce to go around and deal with 
everybody.  Then Congress could regulate everything,” he predicted.124 
Others echoed some of Ervin’s concerns regarding the implications of the 
Administration’s theory for federal constitutional power.  Senator Mike 
Monroney, for instance, worried that the Commerce Clause might authorize 
legislation “in almost every walk of life. . . . [W]here is the stopping place?  
Where is the cutoff?”125  Monroney did not think the Commerce Clause should 
“take in every hamburger stand and every 10-room motel and every guesthouse 
and things of that kind.”126  He feared that the Commerce Clause “would put 
every single line of business that a man can imagine under Federal control 
from now on, not just on bias or prejudice but on anything else the 
 
 120. Id. at 885. 
 121. See id. at 176 (comments of Sen. Strom Thurmond); see also id. at 367 (testimony of 
Miss. Gov. Ross R. Barnett). 
 122. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1733. 
 123. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 37; see also id. at 232, 236. 
 124. Id. at 194. 
 125. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 154; see also id. at 417 (stating 
concern about stretching the Constitution by use of the Commerce Clause); id. at 446 (raising “a 
number of constitutional objections” to the Commerce Clause rationale); id. at 800 (stating that a 
number of committee members were concerned about expansion of the Commerce Clause); id. at 
801 (concurring regarding boundaries on the Commerce Clause). 
 126. Id. at 921. 
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Government would choose to go and do, whether it be licensing or price 
control or otherwise.”127  The Commerce Clause should not apply to “purely 
local matters.”128  Although Southerners were most vocal in raising federalism 
arguments, Northern Republicans voiced similar concerns, though in 
somewhat more restrained language.129 
The Administration dismissed the notion of an infinite Commerce Clause.  
“Of course, there are limits on congressional power under the commerce 
clause,” said a Justice Department Memorandum Robert Kennedy submitted 
on August 9, 1963.130 Congress did not “hold the power to regulate all of a 
man’s conduct solely because he has [a] relationship with interstate 
commerce.”131  Congress could only regulate if there was “a relationship 
between interstate commerce and the evil to be regulated.”132  Similarly, 
Professor Paul A. Freund rejected the argument that the Administration’s 
approach would “obliterate the limits” on Commerce Clause power.133  There 
must be “a functional relationship between the facilities of interstate commerce 
and the abuse or evil” targeted.134 
The opponents’ complaint rested on an archaic view of federalism that 
conceived federal and state governments as acting in distinct, rather than 
overlapping spheres.  Marshall suggested that the states were not rendered 
powerless even though no “clear-cut division” separated federal and state 
domains.135  He said: 
I think that the States have a reservoir of power that goes beyond simply and 
purely intrastate commerce, and that they can regulate matters that affect 
interstate commerce, just like the Federal Government can, in its turn, regulate 
matters that affect intrastate commerce, when that is necessary to effective 
regulation of interstate commerce, which is appropriate.136 
Moreover, absent a conflict or federal preemption, Kennedy argued that states 
would retain vast regulatory authority, particularly because the proposed 
legislation contained a non-preemption clause.137  Of course, the Southerners’ 
 
 127. Id. at 922. 
 128. Id. at 1119 (comments of Sen. Mike Monroney); see also Civil Rights—President’s 
Program, supra note 8, at 192 (comments of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.) (Congress cannot reach 
“local activities”); Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1732 (testimony of Rep. Joe D. Waggoner, Jr.) 
(Commerce Clause “carried to arbitrary extremes that were never contemplated by the Nation’s 
founders”). 
 129. See, e.g., Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1606 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay). 
 130. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 422. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1185. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 240. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 176–77 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy). 
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problem was that the Jim Crow state legislation they would have preferred 
would have conflicted with the entire premise of Title II. 
Finally, some challenged the Commerce Clause rationale on the grounds 
that it violated the text of the Clause or exceeded the bounds of judicial 
doctrine.  Senator Sam Ervin articulated perhaps the most comprehensive 
critique of Title II.  He argued that Congress could not require hotels, motels, 
or other places of public accommodation to serve those traveling in interstate 
commerce because their travel was interrupted when they stopped to sleep.138  
Ervin criticized Title II as an effort: 
to regulate the use of privately owned property and personal activities within 
the borders of a State after interstate commerce has ceased merely because the 
persons using such privately owned property or rendering such personal 
services may use some goods which at some time in the past have moved in 
interstate commerce or may serve some travelers who have journeyed in time 
past from one State to another.139 
Ervin interpreted the Commerce Clause to authorize Congress to regulate “the 
movement of persons, goods, or information from one State to another” and to 
reach intrastate activities only to the extent “necessary or appropriate to its 
effective execution” of its power to regulate interstate movement.140  Ervin 
distinguished three acts the Court had upheld: the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
National Labor Relations Act, and the Agriculture Adjustment Act.  They 
regulated activities “relating to future shipments in interstate commerce[,]” not 
“the use of privately owned property and personal activities within the borders 
of States under the commerce clause after all possible interstate commerce has 
ended.”141  Similarly, Representative Richard Poff argued that neither 
Congress nor the Court had previously “regulate[d] service establishments 
under the interstate commerce clause or . . . establish[ed] what might be called 
a requirement to serve.”142 
B. The Fourteenth Amendment 
The Kennedy Administration did the heavy lifting with respect to the 
Commerce Clause with support from sympathetic legislators.  Legislators, 
however, largely developed the constitutional argument for relying on the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Administration provided some help in that 
respect, but it also offered critiques. 
The case for using the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis of the act rested 
in large part on the fact that the same general purpose animated that 
 
 138. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 31, 36. 
 139. Id. at 213; see also id. at 207–08. 
 140. Id. at 212. 
 141. Id. at 215. 
 142. Rules Committee, supra note 8, at 372–73. 
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constitutional text and the proposed legislation.  Both were conceived to 
address racial inequality.  As Senator John Sherman Cooper argued: 
I do not suppose that anyone would seriously contend that the administration is 
proposing legislation, or the Congress is considering legislation, because it has 
been suddenly determined, after all these years, that segregation is a burden on 
interstate commerce.  We are considering legislation because we believe, as 
the great majority of the people in our country believe, that all citizens have an 
equal right to have access to goods, services, and facilities which are held out 
to be available for public use and patronage.143 
Some argued that the Fourteenth Amendment approach would avoid 
problems inherent in the Commerce Clause.144  Proponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment approach argued that it would reach a broader array of businesses.  
Under prevailing doctrine, the Commerce Clause would apply only to acts that 
affected commerce.  Legislation based on the Commerce Clause would tolerate 
discrimination in public accommodations that did not affect interstate 
commerce.145  Some intrastate discrimination would theoretically escape 
regulation. 
The Fourteenth Amendment approach would be able to prohibit all 
discrimination without regard to degree.146  Although the Fourteenth 
Amendment approach hardly thrilled die-hards who sought to preserve 
segregated public places, it was more palatable to some who worried that the 
Commerce Clause distorted federalism.  Senator John Sherman Cooper argued 
that the interstate commerce clause had traditionally been used to break down 
state lines and relieve states of responsibilities, whereas the Fourteenth 
Amendment was used to hold states to their responsibilities and give them 
incentive “to adhere to the law.”147 And Senator Mike Monroney argued: 
Many of us, I think, are disturbed that this will set a precedent which could 
ultimately result in the Federal Government licensing all types of business by 
making the commerce clause apply to matters far removed from bias or 
discrimination.  If reliance were placed on the 14th amendment, it would be 
aimed strictly at bias and discrimination and would not enlarge upon the vast 
powers that would affect other types of commerce and change our whole 
pattern of State regulation for intrastate business contrary to the true concept of 
goods moving in interstate commerce.148 
 
 143. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 190. 
 144. See id. at 57 (comments of Sen. Norris Cotton). 
 145. Id. at 190 (comments of Sen. John Sherman Cooper). 
 146. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1604–05 (comments of Reps. John V. Lindsay & William 
H. McCulloch). 
 147. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 194; see also Civil Rights, supra 
note 41, at 1603 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay). 
 148. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 220; see also id. at 804–05, 807 
(comments of Sen. Mike Monroney). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 1115 
Indeed, Monroney was so intent on avoiding the Commerce Clause that he 
repeatedly suggested a constitutional amendment to clarify the Fourteenth 
Amendment to eliminate the state action requirement.149 A chorus of others 
joined Monroney’s proposal.150  Of course, that approach would have delayed 
any legislative solution for years. 
Clearly, the Fourteenth Amendment approach faced several obstacles.  The 
Civil Rights Cases required state action as a prerequisite to a violation under 
the Fourteenth Amendment or legislation pursuant to it.  It had struck down 
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the grounds that section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment limited Congress to addressing state action to enforce 
its provisions.  Congress could not address discrimination that private choice 
produced.  The state action doctrine had eroded as the Court had flexed it to 
apply the Equal Protection Clause to some private activity.151  Yet the doctrine 
was not defunct.  The “sit-in” cases during the 1962 term had found some 
relatively conventional form of state action through legislative or executive 
action.152  The Court did not hold that the Equal Protection Clause required a 
private entrepreneur to serve people of all races.  Only Justice Douglas 
endorsed that proposition.153 
Still, in 1963 the decision in The Civil Rights Cases was not quite the 
impediment it had once seemed.  Harvard Dean Erwin Griswold argued that 
“much of the force of that decision ha[d] diminished and the premises on 
which it was based ha[d] been undermined.”154  The Court had more recently 
recognized an expanded concept of state action.155  States regulated businesses 
to a far greater extent in 1963 than was true four score years earlier.156  
Beginning in the 1930s, courts had permitted regulation of private property 
devoted to a public interest to a much greater degree than was true in 1883.157  
 
 149. See, e.g., id. at 220. 
 150. See, e.g., id. at 789–90 (comments of Sen. Clair Engle) (proposing constitutional 
amendment of Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate state action requirement); id. at 802 
(comments of Sen. Mike Monroney); id. at 970–71 (comments of Sen. Norris Cotton and Gov. 
Carl E. Sanders). 
 151. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. 
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 152. See supra notes 27–37 and accompanying text. 
 153. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 281 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“When the 
doors of a business are open to the public, they must be open to all regardless of race if apartheid 
is not to become engrained in our public places.”). 
 154. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 772. 
 155. Id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961)); see also Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1876 (testimony of Joseph 
Rauh). 
 156. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 230–31 (statements of Asst. 
Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold). 
 157. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1876 (testimony of Joseph Rauh). 
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The Civil Rights Cases were “a shell that is only waiting for its obituary 
notice.”158 
Alternatively, others thought The Civil Rights Cases could be 
distinguished.  Three theories were offered.  The Court had decided the case 
before the proliferation of Jim Crow laws.159  State laws since 1883 had 
encouraged some of the discrimination that subsequently occurred and the 
practices that remained in force.160  In some areas, “customs having the force 
of law have operated to establish a uniform community policy of segregation 
in public places.”161  Thus, discrimination might be traceable to state action.  
Moreover, police, executive, and judicial action often enforced private 
discriminatory practices.162  An extension of Shelley v. Kraemer163 might find 
state action here as well.  Finally, some argued that state licensing of 
businesses might provide the required state action.  The “public 
accommodations” bill, S. 1591, which Senators John Sherman Cooper and 
Thomas Dodd introduced, rested on this concept.  Senator Cooper argued: 
The point I make is that the bill which Senator Dodd and I have introduced is 
based on the premise that in the licensing of a business which is held out to the 
public, the State has manifested its interest significantly and in such a way as 
to bring discrimination in such private businesses under the prohibition of the 
14th amendment.  When a State licenses, it has then the power to enforce 
safety regulations, health and sanitation regulations, fire regulations, and all 
other police power regulations, and thereby asserts the public interest.  I would 
go further and say that when it gives a license to a company or private business 
which holds itself out to public use, it confers upon that business the 
opportunity to discriminate.  I believe that it would be found that a business 
which is licensed and which is held out to the public comes within the purview 
of the 14th amendment.164 
Representative John V. Lindsay thought Congress could reach, under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, any places of accommodation the 
state “authorized” or “regulated” that were open to the public,165 an approach 
similar to,166 yet broader than,167 the Cooper–Dodd measure.  Representative 
 
 158. Id. at 1877. 
 159. See, e.g., C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). 
 160. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 224 (testimony of Asst. Atty. 
Gen. Burke Marshall); id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold). 
 161. Id. at 772 (testimony of Dean Erwin Griswold). 
 162. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1376 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy). 
 163. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 164. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 192. 
 165. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1608–10. 
 166. See id. at 1416 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay). 
 167. Id. at 2262–64 (testimony of Rep. Clark MacGregor). 
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Lindsay argued that Congress should pass broad legislation predicated on his 
authority-to-do-business approach and test each case through the courts.168 
All were not convinced that state licensing was tantamount to state action.  
Licensing, they said, was a neutral way to further private enterprise that did not 
involve state operation or state endorsement.169  Robert Kennedy 
acknowledged that “a very strong argument” could be made that licensing was 
not state action.170  Justice Douglas had endorsed the idea that licensing was a 
mode of state action in his Lombard concurrence,171 but no other justice had 
joined his opinion.  Professor Herbert Wechsler, a leading constitutional 
scholar, ridiculed the argument.  He wrote: 
One need not be a lawyer to perceive that the fact that a State requires a 
lunchroom to obtain a license as a means of protecting the public health does 
not make the lunchroom a State agency.  Are all private corporations to be 
viewed as organs of the State because their corporate existence is conferred by 
their State charters?  It puts the matter with excessive charity to say that this is 
a submission which is most unlikely to persuade the Supreme Court and, what 
is more important, should not do so.  In the entire history of the judicial 
interpretation of the 14th amendment, only Justice Douglas has accorded the 
position color of support in an opinion.172 
Moreover, the Cooper–Dodd licensing approach posed dangers of its own.  
Some businesses might escape coverage if they were not licensed.173  
Licensing requirements varied state to state.  Department stores, supermarkets, 
bowling alleys, and amusement parks would be covered in some states but not 
others.174  Because different states licensed different activities, such a law 
would not apply uniformly.175  The licensing approach would also have 
constitutional impacts beyond the field of racial discrimination.  If the Court 
adopted the licensing approach as state action, Senator Hart suggested that any 
licensed business activity would be imputed to the states.176  Such an approach, 
Marshall said, “might have a very, very far-reaching effect on what business 
 
 168. Id. at 1395. 
 169. See, e.g., Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 41–42 (comments of Sen. 
Sam J. Ervin, Jr.). 
 170. Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1419. 
 171. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 282–83 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (licensing 
makes a restaurant an instrumentality of the State). 
 172. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 309; see also id. at 270 (letter of 
Prof. Paul G. Kauper); id. at 275 (letter of Prof. Arthur E. Sutherland); id. at 1188 (Brief of Prof. 
Paul A. Freund). 
 173. Id. at 253 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall). 
 174. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 41, at 428 (Justice Dep’t Mem.). 
 175. Id. at 96–97 (testimony of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy). 
 176. Id. at 224. 
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establishments could and could not do.”177  For instance, efforts to limit speech 
in department stores might raise First Amendment issues.178 
Some worried that relying on some theory of state action might play into 
the hands of segregation’s supporters.  Kennedy worried that states might 
circumvent legislation based on the Fourteenth Amendment “by removing all 
State action.”179  If the state action were discriminatory legislation, it might 
eliminate it from the books.  If it were licensing requirements, it might 
“remove the licensing requirement.”180  Not all viewed these contingencies as 
likely.  Senator Cooper thought it “absolutely foolish” to think states would 
abandon their licensing powers; if they did, he doubted the Court would allow 
them “to escape or avoid the law.”181 
Kennedy thought relying exclusively on the Fourteenth Amendment would 
assume “an extra burden”182 because the Court had declared similar legislation 
unconstitutional eighty years earlier in The Civil Rights Cases.183  Although the 
Administration relied principally on the Commerce Clause, it did not totally 
disregard the Fourteenth Amendment as a possible source of legislative 
power.184 
As the various hearings progressed, however, Kennedy’s enthusiasm for 
the Fourteenth Amendment approach cooled.  Initially, Kennedy thought the 
Fourteenth Amendment provided an alternative basis for the legislation. 
Though controversial, he thought the Court would recognize it.185  By the time 
he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 18, 1963, he was 
less positive.  Kennedy believed that relying solely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment would raise “very far-reaching and grave issues.”186  Finding state 
action in private businesses because they were licensed “would impose on the 
legislation very heavy burdens which it need not carry.”187  The Court would 
need to overturn The Civil Rights Cases, an action that “would have vast 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; see also id. at 247 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall). 
 179. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 167; see also Civil Rights—
President’s Program, supra note 8, at 428 (Justice Dep’t Mem.). 
 180. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 167 (statement of Atty. Gen. 
Robert F. Kennedy); see also Civil Rights, supra note 41, at 1881 (comments of Rep. James C. 
Corman); Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1188 (Brief of Prof. Paul A. 
Freund). 
 181. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 193. 
 182. Id. at 28. 
 183. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 184. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 74 (testimony of Atty. Gen. 
Robert F. Kennedy). 
 185. Id. at 28, 132–33, 166–67. 
 186. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 96. 
 187. Id. 
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constitutional implications” and pose considerable practical difficulties.188  
Still, the Fourteenth Amendment might provide support to the extent Title II 
addressed state legislative, executive, or judicial action promoting 
discrimination.189 
By July 24, 1963, Kennedy essentially rejected the licensing theory by 
itself, agreeing that his views on that subject paralleled Ervin’s.190  The Justice 
Department thought it doubtful that the state was responsible for every person 
it licensed.  Licenses were issued to produce revenue or to maintain health or 
safety standards, not to transform private actors into public bodies.  “[T]reating 
licensees as State agencies would raise substantial and troublesome questions 
as to the applicability of other 14th amendment inhibitions, such as the due 
process clause, to establishments heretofore regarded as generally immune 
from such strictures.”191  The Administration’s narrower approach to the 
Fourteenth Amendment stressed the argument that Congress could remedy the 
effects of state-created discrimination.192  State action might be found in state 
Jim Crow laws or “encouragement and fostering and toleration” of such 
practices.193  The effects of the Jim Crow laws continued to be felt, justifying 
use of the Fourteenth Amendment as an additional basis.194  The Fourteenth 
Amendment authorized Congress to “sweep away” state legislative, executive, 
and judicial action “promoting discrimination.”195  This approach avoided the 
broad implications of the licensing approach, yet might prove vulnerable where 
segregation traced to private preference,196 an increasingly common 
phenomenon since the Court had invalidated state discriminatory laws. 
The Administration argued that the Fourteenth Amendment approach 
would complicate passage197 because The Civil Rights Cases constituted an 
adverse precedent that would afford opponents a constitutional argument to 
advance.198  Republicans initially insisted the contrary was true.  The 
Commerce Clause would encounter resistance because it would present the 
spectre of a more encompassing federal role.199  Some Republicans, however, 
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 189. Id. at 96–97. 
 190. See id. at 153. 
 191. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 426 (Justice Dep’t Mem.). 
 192. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 250 (statements of Asst. Atty. 
Gen. Burke Marshall). 
 193. Id. at 248 (testimony of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall). 
 194. Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 166–67, 183, 186 (testimony of 
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 195. Id. at 96. 
 196. Id. at 251, 253 (statement of Asst. Atty. Gen. Burke Marshall). 
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suggested that “a combination of some kind” that relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause might be the price of their 
support.200 
C. Additional Supports 
Congressional hearings also served as a forum to float two additional, 
rather novel, theories to support Title II.  Kennedy also raised the Thirteenth 
Amendment as a possible constitutional basis for Title II.  Indeed, he said it 
might provide a stronger foundation than the Fourteenth because it did not 
require state action.201  Kennedy suggested that “all of this effort to keep the 
Negro from obtaining really a decent and reasonable life in the United States—
it is all part of a system.”202  The Thirteenth Amendment empowered 
Congress, said Marshall, to address “the remaining badges left over from the 
previous condition of servitude.”203  Title II addressed a “vestige of slavery.”  
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment was a source of legislative power.204 
The argument had a certain appeal.  Jim Crow laws may not have been 
slavery’s immediate successors, but they certainly were badges of second-class 
status that the Thirteenth Amendment addressed in the private sphere.  Indeed, 
a few years later, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, the Court held that the 
Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to outlaw private discrimination 
in the sale of real estate.205  Congress could determine “the badges and 
incidents of slavery” and act to redress them.206  Yet The Civil Rights Cases 
had rejected the Thirteenth Amendment as a basis for the Civil Rights Act of 
1875.  Accordingly, some of the same problems that disqualified the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied to it. 
The Citizenship Clause in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided yet another possible basis for the legislation.  Republican Senator 
Winston L. Prouty suggested it, no doubt as a way to avoid relying on the 
Commerce Clause or encountering the state action obstacle.  Dean Griswold, 
though confessing to having never considered the clause as authority for Title 
 
 200. See, e.g., id. at 1415 (comments of Rep. John V. Lindsay). 
 201. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 74. 
 202. Id at 118; see also Civil Rights—President’s Program, supra note 8, at 152 (relating 
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supra note 8, at 429 (Justice Dep’t Mem.). 
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II, conceded that “the more I think of it, in the few seconds since you first 
suggested it, the more potentialities it seems to me to have.”207  The Prouty–
Griswold interpretation expanded the conventional meaning of the Citizenship 
Clause.  The Clause was designed to reverse the infamous Dred Scott decision; 
it had not been used as a basis to grant equal rights to African-Americans.  The 
Equal Protection Clause seemed a more natural means to achieve that end.  Yet 
Senator Prouty’s impulse, that citizenship should confer a right not to be 
denied service based on race, had intuitive appeal.  Indeed, eminent scholars 
have recently suggested the Clause would have provided an appealing basis to 
support the Court’s decision in Bolling v. Sharpe208 that Congress could not 
create racially separate schools in the District of Columbia.209  In 1963, 
however, it appeared a less developed theory than the Commerce Clause or 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
D. The Private Property Argument 
Opponents of the public accommodations provisions attacked such 
governmental regulation as an infringement of private property rights protected 
by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.210  For instance, Governor 
Ross Barnett of Mississippi testified: 
The right to do business or to decline to do business with any individual is an 
inseparable part of said citizen’s right to operate and control his privately 
owned business.  If this right is destroyed by the Federal Government, the 
citizen has been deprived of one of his inalienable rights just as surely as 
though the Federal Government had confiscated his physical personal 
property.211 
Governor George Wallace thought proposed Title II “would strike the death 
knell of the private property ownership in this country.”212  Governor Farris 
Bryant argued that the Ninth Amendment protected the freedom to own 
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 208. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 209. See Professor Drew S. Days, III, Revised Opinions in Brown v. Board of Education: 
Drew S. Days (concurring), in  JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
SHOULD HAVE SAID (2001) 92, 97–98. 
 210. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 160, 423, 426 
(comments of Sen. Strom Thurmond); id. at 392 (statements of Gov. Ross R. Barnett). 
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property.213  Strom Thurmond castigated Title II as an uncompensated 
taking.214 
These notions of private property, preposterous as they now seem, and 
extreme even when voiced, were not in 1963 totally implausible.  During the 
Court’s conference on the “sit-in” cases on November 9, 1962, several Justices 
expressed views sympathetic to the right of a private restaurant to exclude 
persons based on race.215  One year later, when the Court considered a second 
set of sit-in cases in October 1963, the picture was not much different.  
Although some of the cases might contain sufficient hints of police or 
legislative action to constitute plausible cases of state action,216 Bell v. 
Maryland217 presented the issue squarely.  Whereas Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices Douglas and Brennan were prepared to hold that places of public 
accommodations, unlike homes, could not exclude persons based on race, 
Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White thought the Constitution did 
not bar private entrepreneurs from so doing because their conduct was not state 
action.218 
Nonetheless, the Justices’ argument regarding private property was 
significantly different from the one Barnett and others urged.  While some of 
these Justices did not think the Constitution itself precluded discrimination in 
places of public accommodations, they also did not think the Constitution 
precluded Congress from banning it.  Thus, Justice Black thought “Congress 
can pass a law making it a duty for a storekeeper to sell to all comers,”219 a 
position many of his colleagues apparently shared.220 
The argument the Southerner politicians raised was essentially a 
“smokescreen.”221  It gave private property an inviolability that would preclude 
commonly accepted forms of governmental regulation.  Congress typically 
regulated use of private property that was reasonably related to a problem 
within its power to address.222  Some thirty-two states had enacted laws 
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outlawing discrimination in private businesses.223  Moreover, concerns 
regarding the sanctity of private property had not stopped Southern states from 
adopting Jim Crow laws forbidding entrepreneurs from serving blacks.  If 
private property owners’ rights were not offended by laws forbidding service, 
why would they be breached by laws requiring service?  As Robert F. 
Kennedy put it, “[s]urely it is no greater an infringement to compel 
nondiscrimination than it has been to compel discrimination.”224 
When challenged with the incongruity in his position, Governor George 
Wallace recast the issue as involving an assault on federalism, not on private 
property.  “That is what we are saying, let the States handle this matter. . . .”225  
Local officials, unlike Washington bureaucrats, were accessible to aggrieved 
citizens.226  Regardless of the merits of the federalism argument, the retreat 
exposed a weakness in the Southern position.  They championed the sanctity of 
private property only when Washington was the regulator.  They were happy to 
allow local government to regulate away.  As such, the private property 
argument collapsed into one about federalism or about the propriety of 
segregation. 
E. The Briefs 
In addition to the oral testimony regarding constitutional issues, Congress 
received written submissions discussing those issues from a range of interested 
parties—scholars, political leaders, citizens.  Two were particularly 
noteworthy—a brief by Professor Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law School and 
one the Justice Department submitted on August 9, 1963, to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Freund brief had some impact.227  
Freund enjoyed uncommon stature in American legal circles.  The New York 
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Times described him as “a revered figure in the constitutional law field”228 in 
quoting his opinion; Senators gushed about him.229 
Freund argued that the Commerce Clause was “clearly adequate and 
appropriate” to support Title II.230  Congress had frequently used it to regulate 
local practices that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.231  In regulating 
such activities, the aggregate effect of all similar practices on a national scale, 
not just those of the establishment being regulated, were counted.232  The fact 
that Congress’s real motive was to redress a moral wrong did not render the 
Commerce Clause irrelevant.  “Where social injustices occur in commercial 
activities[,] the commerce power is a natural and familiar means for dealing 
with them,” he wrote.233 
Freund also cautioned against relying on the Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Civil Rights Cases presented an impediment.  The difficulty, Freund said, was 
that “to state the principle that would underlie an overruling is far from 
easy.”234  Overruling The Civil Rights Cases would “have a momentum of 
principle that might carry it far beyond the issues of racial discrimination or 
public accommodations.”235  Whereas Congress could determine how much of 
its Commerce Clause power to use on a case-by-case basis, overruling The 
Civil Rights Cases might expand rights under the Fourteenth Amendment in 
ways not anticipated.236 
The Justice Department memorandum also argued that Congress clearly 
had power under the Commerce Clause to pass Title II.237  Relying on the 
Fourteenth Amendment alone was more treacherous.  Congress need not 
choose between the two theories.238  Under the Commerce Clause, Congress 
could regulate local activities and moral wrongs that affected interstate 
commerce alone or when aggregated with other such activities.  Title II 
addressed the sort of effects Commerce Clause legislation often targeted—
artificial restraints on markets, restrictions on travel, conditions that adversely 
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affect allocations of resources, demonstrations and protests which interfere 
with commerce.239 
The Justice Department, like Freund, viewed The Civil Rights Cases as a 
formidable obstacle to the Fourteenth Amendment theory.240  To sustain Title 
II based solely on the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would need to 
overrule or distinguish that precedent.  The Justice Department did not think 
the licensing theory likely to succeed, nor was it optimistic that a coherent 
theory could simply address businesses affected with a public interest.241  The 
Justice Department thought a more promising theory would begin from the 
premise that public segregation was “the product of and supported by State 
action.”242  In remedying such practices, Congress was not confined to address 
only the actions of state officials.  To end state support for discrimination, it 
could go beyond the substantive prohibitions of the Equal Protection Clause to 
outlaw discrimination itself.243  Section 5, like the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, allowed Congress to use reasonable means to achieve constitutional 
ends.244  Still, the questions and controversy regarding the Fourteenth 
Amendment, juxtaposed with the certain applicability of the Commerce 
Clause, compelled reliance on both. 
F. The Committees 
Congressional committees had little trouble finding that the proposed 
legislation was constitutional.  Although the Senate Judiciary Committee never 
acted on the proposed legislation, the Commerce Committee reported S. 
1732.245  It concluded that The Civil Rights Cases were not an impediment to 
passage of Title II.  The 1875 law rested on section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, not the Commerce Clause.  A “large body of legal thought” 
believed the present Court would reverse its 1883 decision or that “changed 
circumstances” would suggest a distinction.246  Ultimately, the merits of that 
debate were irrelevant because S. 1732, unlike the 1875 act, rested on the 
Commerce Clause, not section 5.  The Commerce Committee attached and 
relied upon Professor Freund’s analysis.  It quoted his conclusion that “[t]he 
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commerce power is clearly adequate and appropriate. . . .  No impropriety need 
be felt in using the Commerce Clause as a response to a deep moral 
concern.”247  Congress could “regulate commerce or that which affects it for 
other than purely economic goals,” the Committee concluded.248 
The Committee thought the legislation necessary primarily to address the 
deprivation of human dignity segregation caused.  The measure also addressed 
“economic burdens created by discrimination in public establishments.”249  
The Committee thought this nation’s economy suffered “when the 
discriminatory practices employed by such establishments lead to 
demonstrations or boycotts.”250  This effect on commerce was the first, but not 
the only, one the Committee cited.  The Committee also found that 
discrimination reduced convention business and decreased travel, that  industry 
was reluctant to locate in segregated areas, and that professional life was 
discouraged.251 
Three Committee members appended their individual views to the report, 
and each emphasized constitutional issues.  Senator Monroney favored civil 
rights legislation, including a public accommodations provision.  He thought S. 
1732 went beyond constitutional limits in regulating “purely local matters.”252  
The clause should be limited to regulating interstate travellers and interstate 
businesses to avoid compromising “our dual system of government.”253 
Senator Strom Thurmond also emphasized federalism issues, which he 
mislabelled “separation of powers.”  The Tenth Amendment, he said, was 
intended to preserve “the separation of powers doctrine.”254 The Tenth 
Amendment “was intended to be a bulwark against the eroding effects of the 
passage of time, faulty memories and an ever-grasping Central 
Government.”255  The legislation was not authorized by the Fourteenth 
Amendment due to the absence of state action, by the Thirteenth Amendment 
because segregation was not slavery, or by the Commerce Clause because it 
was not intended to allow regulation of “the use of purely private property at 
rest within the confines of any particular State.”256  Moreover, S. 1732 
interfered with private property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment.257 
 
 247. Id. at 13 (quoting Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 1190). 
 248. S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 13. 
 249. Id. at 17. 
 250. Id. at 17. 
 251. Id. at 17–20. 
 252. Id. at 40. 
 253. S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 41. 
 254. Id. at 43. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 55. 
 257. Id. at 62–65. 
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Finally, Senator Norris Cotton thought S. 1732 distorted the Commerce 
Clause “dangerously” and expanded it “enormously.”258  A constitutional 
amendment was needed to address racial discrimination.  In the meantime, he 
would limit legislation to banning segregation in publicly owned 
establishments and based on state or local law. 
The House Committee on the Judiciary reported the full bill (H.R. 
7152).259  It limited its constitutional discussion to some conclusory 
statements.  A few members, however, raised constitutional concerns in their 
individual comments.  Representative George Meader, for instance, thought 
H.R. 7152, as well as the Administration’s bill, stretched the Commerce Clause 
and Equal Protection Clause.260  Because the Court would not enforce 
constitutional limits, Congress must.261  A minority report for six 
representatives claimed Title II violated the Fifth and Tenth Amendments and 
found no support from the Commerce Clause or the Thirteenth or Fourteenth 
Amendments.262  Representative William McCulloch, for himself and six 
Republican colleagues, presented a supplemental report defending H.R. 7152 
on the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment.263  Congress had ample 
power to remove burdens on the free flow of commerce.264  The Republicans 
relied on Wickard and other precedents for showing the breadth of the 
clause.265  There was ample evidence that discrimination had an “adverse 
effect” on commerce—travel was impeded, business discouraged, and 
demonstrations had a chilling impact.266 
G. The Floor Debates 
Constitutional issues relating to Title II did not command so great a 
percentage of the floor discussion in the House and Senate as they had in 
earlier stages.  Several factors account for this change.  Both bodies addressed 
the entire legislation, not simply Title II, so attention was divided; previously 
the Senate Commerce Committee at least had addressed only Title II.  The 
debate between the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment had been 
 
 258. S. REP. NO. 88-872 at 78. 
 259. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963). 
 260. Id. at 50–52. 
 261. Id. at 51–52. 
 262. Id. at 91–94. 
 263. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (Part 2) at 1–32 (1963). 
 264. Id. at 13. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 7–15.  The House Committee on Rules held nine days of public hearings on H.R. 
7152 in January 1964.  The Committee was chaired by Representative Howard W. Smith, an 
ardent segregationist.  Other than a few proponents of the bill, most testifying were foes, many of 
whom raised constitutional objections.  See generally Rules Committee, supra note 8.  For an 
excellent account of strategic issues, see CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST 
DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 85–100 (1985). 
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resolved and so was no longer pertinent.  Much floor time in the Senate related 
to procedural matters and to the Southerners’ filibuster.  Although some of the 
latter related to the Constitution, it was rambling and not particularly germane 
to Title II. Finally, many legislators were talking to their electorates and, 
accordingly, esoteric discussions of the Commerce Clause may have seemed 
unappealing. 
Yet constitutional issues were not ignored during floor debates.  The 
discussion followed the lines of committee hearings.  In the House, proponents 
made general assertions of the constitutionality of Title II.267  Opponents were 
more expressive in raising constitutional issues as a reason to oppose the 
legislation.  Representative Edwin E. Willis condemned Title II for going 
beyond prior Court rulings.268  Title II improperly regulated “intrastate” 
commerce while destroying property rights that the Constitution protects.269  
The legislation violated the text of the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause and ignored prevailing precedent, namely The Civil Rights Cases.270  
Others thought Title II would “destroy” the Constitution.271  To Representative 
Arthur Winstead, Title II was “the most glaringly unconstitutional piece of 
legislation ever introduced in the Congress.”272  Representative Richard Poff 
thought the Commerce Clause had been “distorted by expansion.”273 
Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Democratic floor leader for the bill, 
provided the most significant discussion of constitutional issues relating to 
 
 267. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 1512 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Madden) (Title II “clearly 
consistent” with Constitution); id. at 1522–26 (remarks of Rep. Celler) (Title II constitutional); id. 
at 1529 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1540 (comments of Rep. 
Lindsay) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1592 (remarks of Rep. MacGregor) (Title II 
constitutional); id. at 1592 (remarks of Rep. Corman) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1593 
(Remarks of Rep. Farbstein) (Title II constitutional); id. at 1594 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer) (Title II 
constitutional under Equal Protection Clause); id. at 1599 (remarks of Rep. Minish) (Title II 
constitutional under Commerce Clause); id. at 1600 (Remarks of Rep. Daniels) (Title II 
constitutional); id. at 1602 (remarks of Rep. Mathias) (Title II constitutional under Commerce 
Clause); id. at 1966 (remarks of Rep. Griffin) (Title II constitutional under Commerce Clause). 
 268. Id. at 1533. 
 269. Id. at 1533–34. 
 270. Id. at 1534. 
 271. Id. at 1537 (remarks of Rep. Whitener); id. at 1545 (remarks of Rep. Forrester) (Title II 
“mak[es] shambles of our Constitution”); id. at 1606 (remarks of Rep. Dorn) (Title II destroys 
Constitution); id. at 1606–07 (remarks of Rep. Jones) (Title II makes “mockery” of Constitution); 
id. at 1617 (remarks of Rep. Roberts) (Title II “stretch[es] the commerce clause to the breaking 
point”). 
 272. 110 CONG. REC. 1702 (1964); see also id. at 1515 (remarks of Rep. Colmer) (calling 
certain provisions  “vicious assaults upon the Constitution”); id. at 1540 (remarks of Rep. 
Bennett) (Title II unconstitutional); id. at 1604 (remarks of Rep. Selden) (Title II 
unconstitutional); id. at 1605 (remarks of Rep. Huddleston, Jr.) (Title II unconstitutional); id. at 
1618 (remarks of Rep. Abernathy) (Title II unconstitutional). 
 273. Id. at 1585. 
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Title II.  The bill found firm support in the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The fact that Title II raised “a moral question” did not disqualify 
the Commerce Clause as a source of legislative power.  Moreover, racial 
discrimination had “clear economic consequences.”274 
Humphrey outlined prevailing Commerce Clause doctrine with ample 
citations to precedents.  Congress had power to regulate matters affecting 
commerce.  Congress could reach local businesses affecting commerce, 
including small ones.  He repeated the effects Marshall had identified months 
earlier.275  The Civil Rights Cases had not addressed Congress’s authority to 
regulate under the Commerce Clause.  The case did limit Congress under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to addressing state action and the bill, to the extent it 
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, was so limited. 
III.  A CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE 
A. Congress as Moot Court 
Congress’s consideration of Title II presented a dialogue on constitutional 
principles in several respects.  The Department of Justice presented a forceful 
case for the constitutionality of Title II with supporting constitutional 
arguments from sympathetic legislators like Senators Magnuson, Hart, Javits, 
and Humphrey and Representatives Celler and McCulloch.  Those preferring 
to rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, such as Senators Cooper and Monroney 
and Representative Lindsay, presented an alternative constitutional theory.  
The Administration was called to respond to their positions.  Finally, die-hard 
foes of Title II cast their arguments in constitutional terms, invoking structural 
ideas related to federalism and rights of private property and free association.  
These and other constitutional issues were debated at length before those 
congressional committees. 
In many respects, the congressional debate followed the pattern of a 
Supreme Court case.  Advocates on competing sides (e.g., Kennedy vs. Ervin 
and Thurmond) argued the constitutional issues.  They had opportunity to 
respond to each other’s points and questions.  At times, they were helped by 
sympathetic colleagues who threw them life-lines to rescue them from hostile 
questions.  The principals filed legal memoranda (e.g., Justice Department 
memoranda) that were supplemented by amicus filings by allies (e.g., Freund’s 
brief).  They relied on conventional arguments of the sort used in court—
arguments from the Constitution’s text, the framers’ intent, constitutional 
structure, precedent, morality, sociological evidence. 
 
 274. 110 CONG. REC. 6535 (1964). 
 275. Id. at 6536. 
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In some respects, the congressional hearings served as almost a moot court 
for arguments the Administration later presented to the Court.  Many of those 
on the committees had backgrounds not too different from those on the 
Supreme Court.276  Their reactions might herald those of some Justices. 
The Administration’s constitutional position evolved over time.  Although 
it always emphasized the Commerce Clause, its reliance on the Fourteenth 
Amendment diminished as the legislative discussion continued.  Whereas 
initially Robert Kennedy predicted that The Civil Rights Cases would be 
overturned, he gradually adopted a narrower view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  He rejected the licensing theory and adopted a relatively narrow 
state-action theory.  Title II was drafted to accommodate, rather than test, The 
Civil Rights Cases, by incorporating, not stretching, the state action concept. 
Although the Administration adhered to a broad vision of the Commerce 
Clause, its articulation of that theory changed as the legislative process 
progressed.  For instance, it modified what it identified as adverse effects on 
commerce as the legislative proceedings continued.  Initially, it did not 
emphasize protests against discrimination as an adverse effect on commerce 
that justified Title II.  After Kennedy extemporaneously raised that issue in 
response to a question, the Justice Department began to cite it as a principal 
effect.  By the time it argued the Heart of Atlanta and McClung cases, this 
point had become its main theory. 
B. Shaping Constitutional Choices 
Yet the congressional hearings were not simply spring training for the 
judicial challenge that followed.  They were much more than an opportunity 
for the Administration to test drive its constitutional theories.  Rather, they 
represented Congress discharging its duty to interpret the Constitution.277  This 
essential stage of the legislative process represented the time when crucial 
constitutional choices were shaped and made. 
Opponents of the bill deployed constitutional arguments to justify their 
position.  To them, Title II represented an assault on federalism that ignored 
the notion of limited government and gave no weight to the Tenth Amendment.  
It disregarded limitations in constitutional text (e.g., Congress could only 
regulate interstate commerce and could only reach state action) and precedent 
(e.g., the Civil Rights Cases).  It gave no deference to private property contrary 
to the Fifth Amendment. 
Proponents of the Act answered these, and other, assaults.  
Notwithstanding the public outcry after Birmingham, Title II would not have 
 
 276. The Court consisted of two successful politicians (Chief Justice Warren and Justice 
Black), four who had served in Cabinet or subcabinet posts (Justices Douglas, Clark, White, and 
Goldberg), and three former judges (Justices Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart). 
 277. See generally FISHER, supra note 4, at 231–34. 
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emerged from committee, or would have done so in a weakened state, had the 
Administration and its legislative allies not made a convincing case that the 
measure was constitutional and offered a theory to support its proposal. 
By the time Title II had cleared committees, the Administration and 
legislative leaders had made crucial constitutional choices.  For instance, they 
elected to rely primarily on the Commerce Clause.  They jettisoned the 
licensing theory.  The breadth of the Commerce Clause allowed them to rely 
on a relatively uncontroversial concept of state action.  These decisions shaped 
the constitutional issues later presented to the Court. 
C. Congress as Constitutional Interpreter 
Congressmen took seriously their duty to consider the constitutional 
arguments.  Their attention to constitutional interpretation was evident in their 
exhaustive discussion of constitutional clauses and in questions they raised 
regarding constitutional theory.  Their conduct signified that they did not 
believe the Supreme Court was the exclusive constitutional interpreter. 
Moreover, many legislators discussed their duty to consider constitutional 
issues.  One of the most outspoken proponents of legislative constitutional 
interpretation was Senator Strom Thurmond.  Thurmond argued that a 
Congressman’s oath required that “the very first step that he must or should 
take is to determine, Is this legislation constitutional? And if he decides it is 
not, then he shouldn’t go any further.”278  Similarly, Senator John McClellan 
said legislators were “personally abdicating the responsibility with which we 
are charged . . . we are failing to do our duty if we do not ascertain . . . whether 
proposed legislation is constitutional according to our lights before it is 
enacted. . . .”279  The view Senators Thurmond and McClellan expressed of 
their duty to uphold the Constitution as they saw it certainly served their 
political purposes because it justified their predisposition to oppose the 
legislation.  Yet their comments regarding legislative interpretation should not 
be dismissed as opportunistic.  Leading supporters of the bill also championed 
legislative interpretation.280 
 
 278. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 849; see also 110 CONG. REC. 
10,381 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond) (“It is our first duty, before we vote on a bill in the 
Senate, to decide whether a proposed bill is constitutional. . . .”). 
 279. 110 CONG. REC. 10381 (1964); see also id. at 2767 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy) (stating 
that Oath Clause requires congressmen to consider constitutional issues); id. at 2801 (remarks of 
Rep. Fisher) (stating that constitutional government requires legislators assess constitutionality of 
proposed bills). 
 280. See, e.g., Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 84. 
Senator Thurmond.  Mr. Attorney General, do you feel Congress has the right to pass on 
the constitutionality of legislation before it votes? 
Mr. Kennedy.  I think it certainly should consider that, Senator.  I think each individual 
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives should certainly consider that. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1132 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1095 
Some wondered whether they could properly offer legislation at odds with 
prevailing Court precedent.  For instance, Senator John Pastore sought 
reassurance that if he thought The Civil Rights Cases misconstrued the 
Constitution he “would not be violating any law or violating the oath of office 
if I passed or voted for another law identical to the one that was overruled in 
1883, in the hope that the new Supreme Court would hold it constitutional.”281  
Similarly, Senator Claire Engle asked Marshall: 
Now, we all take an oath to support the Constitution, and the Constitution is 
what is written in it, plus what the Supreme Court says it is. 
Now, the Supreme Court, in 1883, said that a bill on all fours with what is 
intended to be done here, was unconstitutional.  How do we stand up and vote 
for it and not violate our oaths? 
Mr. Marshall.  I think you would have to come to the conclusion, as a personal 
matter, that the Supreme Court would not decide that case the same way 
now.282 
Witnesses and legislators freely discussed constitutional issues and 
recognized a duty to consider constitutionality in deciding how to legislate.  
Yet, most implicitly accepted the notion of judicial supremacy regarding 
constitutional interpretation.283  Look again at the preceding exchanges.  
Senator Pastore qualified his rhetorical question regarding his right to act at 
odds with the Court’s decision in The Civil Rights Cases with the condition “in 
the hope that the new Supreme Court would hold it constitutional.”284 He 
implicitly conceded the Court interpretive supremacy.  Senator Engle thought 
the Constitution “is what is written in it, plus what the Supreme Court says it 
is.”285 Finally, Marshall, one of the most learned participants in the 
discussions, thought a legislator could support such legislation if he thought 
the Court would not again reach the same conclusion.286 
 
Senator Thurmond.  In the oath we take as Members of Congress to support and defend 
the Constitution, do you not feel we have an obligation as the very first question to ask 
ourselves, “Is this legislation constitutional?”  And if we conclude it is not, if any Member 
concludes it is not, then we should go no further, even though the goals desired to be 
obtained might be laudatory. 
Mr. Kennedy.  Well, I think it is certainly an important question for every Member of 
Congress to consider, as I have said. 
Id. 
 281. Id. at 252. 
 282. Id. at 248. 
 283. See, e.g., id. at 28 (statement of Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy) (predicting the Court 
would uphold Title II under Fourteenth Amendment). 
 284. Id. at 252. 
 285. Civil Rights—Public Accommodations, supra note 5, at 248. 
 286. Id. 
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Others expressed similar sentiments.  “Congress doesn’t determine what is 
under the interstate commerce clause.  The Constitution and court decisions 
determine that,”287 declared Senator Warren Magnuson.  “Regardless of what 
we say the Supreme Court still has the final word to declare which provision of 
the Constitution allows or disallows this legislation,” said Senator Frank 
Lausche.288 
There was one group that rejected the idea that the Court had the final say: 
the Southern foes of the legislation.  In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of 
Education,289 some had denied that Supreme Court decisions bound officials 
who read the Constitution differently.  Governor Barnett, for instance, denied 
that the Supreme Court’s decisions were “the law of the land.”290 
Of course, those denying that the Court was the ultimate constitutional 
interpreter were not consistent in their position.  Although prepared to 
challenge Brown or expansive Commerce Clause decisions, they embraced The 
Civil Rights Cases.  Supporters of the Civil Rights Act tended to take a more 
nuanced position.  They accepted the Court as the ultimate interpreter and 
agreed The Civil Rights Cases were law.  Still, they thought Congress had 
grounds to believe the Court would not follow that old precedent and, 
accordingly, Congress could pass inconsistent legislation. 
The Administration’s emphasis on the Commerce Clause rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment reflected an acceptance of judicial supremacy, at least 
 
 287. Id. at 71; see also id. at 72 (meaning of interstate commerce clause “depends on the 
interpretation by the courts of the Constitution”).  Senator Magnuson and journalist James J. 
Kilpatrick discussed this issue in the following exchange: 
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authority to do one or the other. 
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Constitution is what our nine friends say it is. 
Id. at 430. 
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Pastore’s statement that “[w]e have drifted into the habit here of speaking of decisions of the 
Supreme Court as being sacrosanct, as being irreversible and irrevocable.  There have been 
instances where the Supreme Court overruled itself on all fours, haven’t there?”). 
 289. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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as a fact of life.  It recognized that The Civil Rights Cases made reliance on the 
Fourteenth Amendment strategically treacherous.  This decision itself reflected 
a realization that many congressmen would defer to Supreme Court precedent, 
even one eighty years old.  The belief that the Fourteenth Amendment 
approach “adds a very heavy burden to the bill”291 was implicitly based upon 
the Administration’s appreciation of the power of the belief of the Court as the 
ultimate constitutional interpreter.  Moreover, the Administration relied 
heavily on judicial precedent in justifying reliance on the Commerce Clause.292 
Congress’s deference to the Court extended to the manner in which it 
relied on the Fourteenth Amendment.  Ultimately, Title II did not follow the 
Cooper–Dodd–Lindsay approach of viewing licensing or regulating as state 
action because only Justice Douglas seemed disposed to embrace that position.  
Instead, Congress essentially incorporated a narrow state-action concept 
consistent with judicial precedent. 
Yet Congress’s deference to judicial precedent was reciprocated in the 
Court’s deference to Congress.  Regardless of whether one viewed the Court as 
the ultimate constitutional interpreter or not, Congress clearly had a significant 
role in constitutional interpretation in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
The Court, particularly under the Commerce Clause, had accepted 
congressional legislation for close to thirty years after subjecting it to a relaxed 
standard of review.  United States v. Darby293 and Wickard v. Filburn294 had 
defined the Commerce Clause to afford little judicial scrutiny of legislative 
choice.  By resting the Civil Rights Act on the Commerce Clause, the political 
branches legislated in an area where their conduct enjoyed a generous 
presumption of validity.295 
D. The Court Defers to Congress: Bell v. Maryland 
The Court’s deference to Congress in making constitutional choices 
became evident as the Civil Rights Act moved to passage in late 1963 and 
early 1964.  While Congress addressed the Civil Rights legislation in the 
summer and fall of 1963, the Court considered Bell v. Maryland296 and four 
related “sit-in” cases, some of which raised the issue of whether the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited the owner of a private restaurant from excluding 
customers based on their race.  The sit-in cases decided during the prior term 
 
 291. Id. at 222 (comments of Asst. Atty. Gen. Marshall). 
 292. See, e.g., id. at 422 (Justice Dep’t Mem.) (“Supreme Court decisions have many times 
sustained the power of Congress. . . .”); see also id. at 423 (identifying provisions “authoritatively 
construed” and citing cases only). 
 293. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 294. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 295. Opponents complained of this fact.  See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC., 6668 (1964) (remarks of 
Sen. Thurmond). 
 296. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
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had strained the Court.  Several justices—Black, Harlan, Stewart, Clark—
thought the Fourteenth Amendment did not, standing alone, prohibit places of 
public accommodations from declining to serve blacks based on their race.  
They reasoned that a restaurant, like a home, was private property; the 
proprietor was entitled to exclude persons based on race.  In enforcing trespass 
laws against those he wished to exclude, he was entitled to help from police, 
prosecutors, and courts, and their activity in enforcing private choice was not 
state action.  Justices Douglas and Goldberg, however, distinguished between 
the home (where the owner could exclude based on race) and places serving 
the public (where he could not).  The Court had been able to finesse the issue 
during the 1962 term by deciding on narrower grounds.  The decision had 
camouflaged the degree of division on the Court.  In the sit-in cases heard 
during the 1963 term, as Charles A. Miller put it, “the Court fell apart.”297 
Several of the cases lent themselves to resolution on narrower grounds 
based upon, for instance, police activity, which arguably set a policy of 
discrimination.  In Bell, however, the Court “hit hard bottom,” where, 
according to Chief Justice Warren, the Court got “to the raw of the 
problem.”298  Bell and eleven other Negro students were convicted of 
trespassing following a sit-in at Hooper’s segregated restaurant in Baltimore.  
The hostess, on behalf of the owner, told the students the restaurant would not 
serve them based upon their race.  The owner swore out warrants and the 
police arrested the students.  A Maryland court convicted them of criminal 
trespass.299 
After discussing the case at two conferences in late October, 1963, the 
Court voted, 5-4, to affirm the convictions in Bell v. Maryland.  Following 
Justice Black’s lead, a majority at conference did not regard state enforcement 
of trespass laws at private businesses as the state action, which would bring the 
case within the Fourteenth Amendment.  Yet some Justices worried that such a 
ruling would impair Congress’s ability to pass civil rights legislation.  Justice 
Goldberg reminded his colleagues that “[t]here is legislation pending” and 
argued that such a ruling would “set back legislation indefinitely.”300  Justice 
Brennan, too, observed that a ruling that criminal law could enforce a private 
entrepreneur’s discriminatory choice would mean that “neither Congress nor 
the states [could] legislate otherwise.”301  Brennan feared that such a decision 
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 299. Bell, 378 U.S. at 227–28. 
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would strengthen the hand of those opposed to civil rights legislation with the 
imprimatur of a favorable Court ruling.302 
Ultimately, Justice Brennan circulated a dissent from Justice Black’s 
planned majority opinion in which he suggested a narrow state-law ground to 
decide Bell and thereby avoid the constitutional issue.  In his draft dissent, 
Justice Brennan referred to Title II and predicted that the proposed majority 
ruling would “inevitably enter into and perhaps confuse that debate.”303  
Justice Black circulated a revised draft of his own on May 15, 1964, to meet 
Justice Brennan’s concern.  It said that Bell did not “involve the 
constitutionality of any existing or proposed state or federal legislation 
requiring restaurant owners to serve people without regard to color.”304 
During the fall of 1963 and spring of 1964, as Title II faced its course of 
legislative hurdles, the Justices maneuvered in Bell with the legislation in 
mind.  The Court’s internal discussions reflected a desire not to prejudice the 
congressional debate against Title II.  The crisis was averted when Justice 
Clark switched his position to abandon Justice Black’s opinion only days 
before Bell was to be announced, thereby creating an apparent majority to 
reverse on constitutional grounds.  The case was ultimately decided,305 
however, on narrow grounds which avoided the constitutional issue only ten 
days before the Civil Rights Act passed. 
Even so, the Court’s published opinions made clear that it had decided Bell 
with an eye on Capitol Hill.  Justice Brennan’s majority opinion did not reach 
the Fourteenth Amendment issues or speak to the scope of Congress’s 
legislative power.  Ostensibly, he followed the “Court’s settled practice”306 to 
give state courts first crack at assessing the impact of intervening changes in 
state law.  Yet this federalism rationale was not truly the animating spirit 
behind the opinion.  Rather, Justice Brennan sought to give Congress an open 
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field to legislate without the distorting influence of a constitutional ruling 
likely to confuse its deliberations. 
Ironically, Justice Black shared a similar sentiment.  He began his dissent 
for himself and two others with a disclaimer asserting that the case “does not 
involve the constitutionality of any existing or proposed state or federal 
legislation requiring restaurant owners to serve people without regard to 
color.”307  Justice Black, carefully and repeatedly, distinguished between the 
limits of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and those of section 5.  Bell 
involved only the former.  It did not involve “the power of Congress, acting 
under one or another provision of the Constitution, to prevent racial 
discrimination in the operation of privately owned businesses, nor upon any 
particular form of legislation to that end.”308  Although section 1 only 
proscribed state action, Justice Black suggested that Congress could address 
private action under other constitutional provisions, including section 5.  “This 
section [1] of the Amendment, unlike other sections, is a prohibition against 
certain conduct only when done by a State. . . .”309  Justice Black added a 
footnote following the words “unlike other sections,” which referred only to 
section 5.310  Clearly, the dissent’s message to Congress was that constitutional 
limits under section 1 might not limit Congress’s section 5 remedial power. 
Justice Goldberg’s concurrence also signalled his willingness to defer to 
Congress.  While joining Justice Brennan’s opinion, he reached the 
constitutional issues only to express disagreement with Justice Black’s 
conclusion.311  Justice Goldberg thought, too, that section 1 afforded a right to 
all Americans to be treated equally regarding access to public accommodations 
including inns, restaurants, lunch counters, and soda fountains.  This right did 
not preclude Congress from acting to implement section 1 under section 5 or 
the Commerce Clause,312 he hastened to add.  Congress could “fashion a law 
drawing the guidelines necessary and appropriate to facilitate practical 
administration and to distinguish between genuinely public and private 
accommodations.”313  That was, of course, exactly what Congress had done to 
Title II.  The Court’s mandate was more limited.  It could “pass only on 
justiciable issues coming here on a case-to-case basis.”314 
Only Justice Douglas sought to claim broad grounds for the Court in 
setting the boundaries.  Congress was “conscientiously considering” the issue 
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of access to public accommodations Bell raised, yet the Court stood “mute, 
avoiding decision of the basic issue by an obvious pretense.”315  The Court 
should not “leave resolution of the conflict to others” but should clarify “the 
issues for the Congress and for the public.”316  He, too, would find state action 
in the use of the judicial machinery to enforce racial discrimination at places of 
public accommodations. 
In all, eight of the nine Justices (all but Justice Douglas) in Bell preferred 
to allow Congress to make the initial constitutional judgments.  Five of the 
nine317 so expressed themselves. 
E. Shaping Judicial Choice 
The constitutional analysis that the Administration and Congress made 
regarding Title II ultimately impacted the work of the Court.  In deciding to 
rely primarily on the Commerce Clause, in rejecting the licensing theory, and 
in adopting a relatively safe interpretation of state action, Congress simplified 
the constitutional choices the Court faced in the litigation, which all recognized 
was inevitable.  This outcome was not serendipitous.  Just as the 
Administration embraced a constitutional approach likely to produce the 
maximum remedy consistent with political realities in Congress, so, too, did it 
seek a course most likely to resonate with at least five, and hopefully nine, 
Justices.  Rather than asking the Court to overturn or distinguish The Civil 
Rights Cases, Congress essentially crafted Title II to minimize the relevance of 
that precedent.  In so doing, it eliminated an issue that might have proven 
controversial for at least some Justices.  Moreover, it avoided the licensing 
theory that had found little support at the Court and, which in Moose Lodge 
No. 107 v. Irvis,318 the Court soon rejected. 
The Court had little trouble upholding the constitutionality of Title II under 
the Commerce Clause when the question was presented in Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States319 and Katzenbach v. McClung.320  In Heart of 
Atlanta, a motel owner sought a declaratory judgment that Title II violated the 
Constitution.321  He claimed Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce 
Clause, deprived the motel owner of liberty and property without due process 
of law, and subjected it to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment by making it serve African-Americans.322  The Heart of Atlanta 
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Motel was near two interstate highways and solicited interstate business.323  In 
McClung, Ollie’s Barbeque sought to limit blacks to a takeout service while 
serving whites in its restaurant.324  The restaurant was located some distance 
from the interstate and presumably served a local clientele.325 About forty-six 
percent of its food had moved in interstate commerce.326  Thus, it came within 
the terms of Title II, which extended its coverage “to restaurants which serve 
food a substantial portion of which has moved in commerce.”327 
In Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court 
essentially read the Constitution the way the Kennedy Administration and 
Congress had.  In Heart of Atlanta, the Court concluded that Congress 
possessed ample powers under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II, thus 
making it unnecessary to consider other justifications.328  The Civil Rights 
Cases were inapplicable because the Court in 1883 had not deemed the 1875 
Act to rest on the Commerce Clause.329  Moreover, increased mobility of 
persons and goods implicated the Commerce Clause in 1964 as it had not 
eighty years earlier.330 
Although Congress made no specific findings regarding the adverse effects 
on interstate commerce, the Court found the record full of evidence that racial 
discrimination burdened commerce.331  Congress could address such activity 
under the Commerce Clause if the regulated activity was commerce 
concerning more than one state and had “a real and substantial relation to the 
national interest.”332  The activity Title II regulated met these criteria.  
Congress could address “moral and social wrong[s]” under the commerce 
power especially because discrimination disrupted commerce.333  Congress 
could reach “purely local” activities if they impacted interstate commerce.334  
Congress was free to use any means to remove obstructions to commerce that 
were “reasonably adapted to the end” the Constitution permitted.335 
Similarly, in McClung, the Court had little trouble finding that 
discrimination chilled commerce.  As applied to Ollie’s Barbeque, the refusal 
to serve a portion of the population decreased the amount of food bought 
through interstate commerce to serve to customers.  The diminished volume at 
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Ollie’s Barbeque may have been trivial, but when aggregated with others 
similarly situated, as Wickard allowed,336 it was substantial.337  Congress had a 
rational basis to find that “racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and 
adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce.”338  The lack of 
evidence linking discriminatory restaurant services with the flow of interstate 
food was immaterial given the more general proof.  The Court was not going to 
look over Congress’s shoulder to second-guess its choices in resolving what 
Congress thought to be “a national commercial problem of the first 
magnitude.”339  Subject to any textual limit, Congress’s power “in this field 
[was] broad and sweeping.”340 
Quite clearly, the Court deferred broadly to Congress in accepting its 
constitutional judgments.  Yet the fact that the branches engaged in a 
constitutional dialogue did not mean they reached agreement on all points.  
The Court’s rulings did not coincide perfectly with the Administration’s theory 
as incorporated in the Act Congress passed.  In part, the difference traced to 
the fact that the Government’s argument in Heart of Atlanta and in McClung 
differed in certain particulars from the case it put before Congress.  First, 
although the Act relied on both the Commerce Clause and section 5, the United 
States relied entirely on the Commerce Clause before the Court.341  Second, 
whereas Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall had argued that Congress could 
reach intrastate acts that “affected” commerce, Solicitor General Cox argued to 
the Court that Congress had power to reach interstate travel342 and “local 
activities” that might exert “a substantial and harmful effect upon interstate 
commerce”343 alone or when aggregated with others of which it was 
representative.344  In McClung, the Government repeatedly referred to the 
power to regulate intrastate matters “substantially affecting”345 or which 
“substantially burden”346 commerce, or words to that effect.  Finally, the 
Government’s argument to demonstrate the requisite substantial effects took a 
surprising twist.  Before Congress, the Administration had argued primarily 
that discrimination limited travel, impeded the movement of labor and capital, 
and made certain areas unattractive sites for business or conventions.  The 
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discrimination-leads-to-demonstrations-which-impact-commerce argument was 
something of an afterthought that the Administration introduced as an auxiliary 
point.  Before the Court, that argument catapulted to the first rank.  Racial 
discrimination in places of public accommodation burdened commerce in part 
because it triggered “a wide variety of protests including boycotts, picketing, 
mass demonstrations and other forms of economic warfare,”347 which 
discouraged business.348  Disputes which caused restaurants to close (and 
accordingly not buy products from other states) would diminish interstate 
commerce.349 
The Court accepted Solicitor General Cox’s invitation to decide entirely on 
the Commerce Clause.  All nine Justices joined the opinions of Justice Tom 
Clark in the two cases.  The Justices had discussed whether to rest the decision 
on the Fourteenth Amendment.350  Justice Clark’s opinion concluded that 
“Congress possessed ample power” under the Commerce Clause and 
accordingly the Court did not reach the Fourteenth or Thirteenth Amendment 
arguments.351  It hastened to add that its failure to discuss these provisions did 
not reflect a conclusion regarding their merits.352  Justices Douglas and 
Goldberg would have also relied on the Fourteenth Amendment.  In so stating, 
they relied on the legislative record. 
The Court accepted the argument the Administration advanced, before 
Congress and in its brief, that Congress had broad power to regulate interstate 
travel, including but not limited to removing intrastate obstructions to it.353  
Congress could reach the “local incidents” of interstate commerce, “including 
local activities in both the States of origin and destination” if they had “a 
substantial and harmful effect” upon interstate commerce, the Court held in 
Heart of Atlanta.354  In adopting the “substantial and harmful effect” 
formulation, the Court adopted the test Archibald Cox advanced in his Brief, a 
stricter measure than Robert Kennedy had suggested to Congress.355  In 
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McClung, however, Justice Clark did not use the substantial effects 
formulation that the Solicitor General had urged.356  Instead, he repeatedly 
used formulations similar to that Kennedy and Marshall had urged in 
Congress.357 
In determining whether the racial discrimination worked “a substantial and 
harmful effect” on interstate commerce, however, the Court largely departed 
from the path Solicitor General Cox recommended.  It ignored his basic 
argument—that segregation gave rise to demonstrations and boycotts which 
chilled interstate commerce.  In a long passage in Heart of Atlanta, the Court 
cited other types of evidence from the legislative record of the impact 
discrimination had on interstate travel.  “We shall not burden this opinion with 
further details since the voluminous testimony presents overwhelming 
evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel.”358  
In McClung, like Heart of Atlanta, Justice Clark found the effect on commerce 
in evidence the Administration presented to Congress, not that Cox argued to 
the Court, although it did contain one reference to the tendency of 
discrimination to create “wide unrest” which had “a depressant effect” on 
commerce.359  In conference, Chief Justice Warren had argued against relying 
“on any effect of demonstrations on commerce.”360 
Presumably, the Chief Justice’s comment was sufficient to cause Justice 
Clark to find the substantial effect in arguments which had featured more 
prominently in the Administration’s case to Congress. 
F. Roads Not Taken 
Proponents of the Civil Rights Act failed to develop two constitutional 
arguments that might have helped shape later doctrine.  Although 
Administration and legislative supporters invoked the Commerce Clause, they 
placed little reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause, though that Clause 
expands Congress’s other constitutional powers.  Under it, Congress can use 
means reasonably adapted to achieve constitutional ends.361  On other 
occasions, the Court had recognized that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
augmented Congress’s commerce power.362  The Clause was essentially 
neglected in discussions before Congress and in presenting the case to the 
Court. 
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Nonetheless, Justice Black relied on this Clause in his concurrence in 
Heart of Atlanta.  He noted that “it has long been held that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause . . . adds to the commerce power of Congress the power to 
regulate local instrumentalities operating within a single State if their activities 
burden the flow of commerce among the States.”363  He relied on both Article I 
powers in upholding the Act in Heart of Atlanta and McClung.  Justice Clark 
also relied on it in McClung.364 
Similarly, neither the Administration nor its legislative allies developed an 
argument it might have deployed under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Much of 
the discussion focused on ways to flex the state action requirement to allow 
Congress to legislate regarding private choices.  The argument assumed that 
the state action requirement applied to legislative action under section 5 as well 
as to the constitutional norm section 1 defined.  That approach was certainly 
not preposterous.  It was, of course, the position the Civil Rights Cases took.  
Yet neither was it inevitable.  Unlike section 1, the text of section 5 did not 
refer to “state” action.  Furthermore, substantial evidence suggested the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended Congress to have broad 
latitude to enforce the guarantees of the amendment. 
In its August 9, 1963, memorandum, the Justice Department raised this 
argument.  In order to combat “the evil of State action causing and supporting 
discrimination,” Congress under section 5 “may take in whatever additional 
area is necessary to make the prohibition of the evil effective.”365  If Congress 
concluded that the best way to eliminate “unconstitutional State support for 
nongovernmental discrimination” was to forbid private discrimination, it could 
do so without judicial review.366  Thus, section 5 operated like the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  It allowed Congress to “enact any measure suited to 
prevent or rectify unconstitutional State action even though it may have wider 
ramifications.”367 
The Administration did not push this argument.  Its position, after all, was 
that the Commerce Clause gave Congress all the power it needed.  Why 
complicate matters by pushing a subtle, somewhat esoteric argument that was 
not needed to achieve legislative goals?  Nor did legislators raise an argument 
that required an intimacy with constitutional law few had. 
In Bell v. Maryland, Justice Black certainly flagged this argument.  He 
repeatedly distinguished between section 1, which defined the constitutional 
norm vis a vis state action, and section 5, which authorized Congress to act 
more broadly.  Might Congress, under section 5, have banned private 
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discrimination in places of public accommodation as a means to enforce the 
section 1 prohibition against state imposed denials of Equal Protection? 
The Court may well have accepted the argument in 1964 had it been 
presented to it as a crucial basis behind the Act.  Essentially the same Court 
decided two cases that recognized a broader province for section 5.368  In 
United States v. Guest, six justices in two separate opinions endorsed this 
theory.369  Justice Brennan, for himself, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice 
Douglas concluded that section 5 empowered Congress “to make laws that it 
concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by and arising 
under” the Fourteenth Amendment even if no state actions were involved.370  
Similarly, Justice Clark, for himself and Justices Black and Fortas, agreed that 
“there now can be no doubt” that Congress could use section 5 to address 
private action which interfered with rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.371  Less than three months later, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the 
Court, with only two dissenters, held that Congress could use section 5 to go 
beyond the constitutional norm set forth in the Equal Protection Clause.372 
Had the Administration and Congress relied on such a theory of section 5, 
perhaps the Court would have, too.  Furthermore, had the Court relied on 
section 5 to sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1964, perhaps later justices would 
have been reluctant to narrow their interpretations of section 5 for fear of 
jeopardizing the Act. 
These constitutional surmises, however, are beside the point.  With the 
benefit of hindsight, an expanded Necessary and Proper Clause and section 5 
powers might have helped protect later congressional acts.  Yet it is unfair to 
criticize the Administration or Congress for not leaning on these two theories 
before Congress.  Passage of Title II and the rest of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 required a herculean effort.  Southerners dominated important 
committees and congressional rules made it difficult to overcome their 
opposition.  At various stages of the process, Southern legislative barons or a 
small number of foes could veto the bill.  Proponents of the measure had little 
margin for error.  They sought to reduce constitutional objections by acting 
within Congress’s recognized constitutional power rather than deploying new 
theories to expand that authority.  In an ideal world, it would have been nice to 
have insulated such theories from attack by resting the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 on them.  Yet it is unlikely the measure would have passed if its 
proponents had tried to guarantee this constitutional expansion in addition to 
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pursuing racial justice.  The paramount goal was to pass Title II, not to create 
constitutional doctrine for the next century. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented the culmination of a 
constitutional dialogue involving all three branches.  Whereas studies of 
constitutional interpretation typically focus on the Court, in this instance the 
political branches played the most conspicuous constitutional role.  The 
predominant interpretive role of the executive and legislative branches in this 
battle may be due to several factors. 
First, the Kennedy Administration pushed, and Congress accepted, a 
constitutional theory that rested on a power under which the Court gave 
Congress great latitude.  After Darby and Wickard, the political branches could 
have expected judicial deference to their actions so long as they rested on some 
reasonable link to commerce. 
Second, the political branches took a position regarding the Fourteenth 
Amendment that did not require the Court to fashion new constitutional law.  
They essentially extended the Act to the recognized limits of constitutional 
doctrine but no further.  Because the commerce power supported Title II, they 
needed only modest help from section 5. 
Finally, the executive branch, the majority in Congress, and the Court were 
all sympathetic to the Civil Rights Act.  The political branches were not acting 
at odds with prevailing Court precedent.  On the contrary, the Court had 
recognized civil rights claims under the Equal Protection Clause at a time 
when the executive and legislative branches were barely giving lipservice to 
such matters.  The Court had struck down Jim Crow laws and had strained as 
far as it could to find state action in the “sit-in” cases in 1962 and 1963.  It was 
eager for the political branches to do their part.  As Joseph Rauh observed, the 
Court had “been the engine that has been moving this machinery toward a 
fairer treatment of the Negro.”373  It had been waiting for Congress to come 
aboard, and was not about to put it off.374  The handling of Bell v. Maryland 
testifies to the Court’s interest in facilitating passage of the Act.  Justices 
weighed the impact of Congress’s deliberations on Title II as they crafted their 
positions, switched their votes, and wrote their opinions. 
Still, the Court was not entirely submissive to the Administration’s 
direction.  Whereas the Administration emphasized the impact-of-
demonstration-on-commerce argument in its brief, the Court relied on the other 
effects on commerce it identified in congressional hearings.  Had the Court 
accepted this argument, some of the arguments regarding effects it later 
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rejected in United States v. Lopez375 and United States v. Morrison376 might 
have seemed less attenuated. 
The constitutional discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also suggests 
some limitations of interpretive activity by political branches.  First, Congress 
was heavily dependent on the executive branch and on outside experts for the 
constitutional theories that shaped the Act.  The Administration and outside 
scholars provided the constitutional arguments regarding the Commerce 
Clause on which the Act rested.  Sympathetic legislators provided important 
support but did not provide much aid in developing the argument.  Other 
legislators were more active in articulating alternative theories, which were 
essentially rejected.  Those most vociferous pressed the case that Title II 
violated the Constitution.  In retrospect, those arguments seem frivolous and 
would attract no significant voice today.  Of course, in a different context, one 
can imagine legislators providing the successful constitutional arguments.  It 
just was not the case under the circumstances present here. 
Second, the needs of the legislative process created incentives to rely on 
tried and true constitutional arguments rather than to push innovative positions.  
Arguments that challenged prevailing doctrine were likely to attract 
opposition.  Thus, the Administration retreated from innovative arguments 
regarding the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The passage of Title II represented a triumph of constitutional dialogue.  
As the Court divided regarding the propriety of recognizing a constitutional 
right to service in places of public accommodation, Congress assessed and 
used its constitutional tools to confer such a right.  Thirty years later, when the 
Court recognized some modest limits on Congress’s commerce power in 
United States v. Lopez, it consciously did so in a way that protected Title II.  
Wickard, upon which Congress relied, was preserved;377 and Heart of Atlanta 
and Katzenbach v. McClung were favorably cited.378  The “economic 
activities” test that was introduced as the measure of when Congress could 
regulate intrastate activities clearly included Title II.  A Constitution that did 
not preserve its essence had become inconceivable. 
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